For decades already, pension system reforms in many European countries, especially Poland, have been implemented without ex ante evaluation of the likely consequences, both in terms of macroeconomic outcomes and in terms of welfare. Most macroeconomic models of pension systems assume people have perfect foresight and are rational. In these models, a correct response to longevity and some of the pension system reforms is to increase private voluntary savings and labor supply. However, real world data suggest that such response, if occurs at all, is relatively weak. It follows that life-time savings and labor supply decisions may be strongly affected by short-term concerns. We will design models with incomplete rationality that will be able to at least partially replicate this stylized fact. We will then consider if and which instruments incentivizing pension savings may be welfare enhancing.
More details about the project "Modeling pension" available on the website.
coordination: Joanna Tyrowicz
Joanna Tyrowicz is an Assistant Professor of Economics at University of Warsaw and President for the Foundation of Admirers and Mavens of Economics. She earned her PhD in Economics in 2006 at Faculty of Economics, University of Warsaw, she also holds a degree from Katholike Universiteit Leuven. As of 2007 she serves as an Economic Advisor at Economic Institute of National Bank of Poland, specializing in labor market and household issues. I have also been a consultant at the World Bank in projects. In 2009 she was a Fulbright scholar at Columbia University, and in 2010 she was a Mellon Fellow at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Studies.
Her tenure book “Unemployment Hysteresis” was awarded the Prize for Best Economic Book of 2014 by Polish Economic Association.