


IBS WORKING PAPER 05/2026
JULY 2026

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Abstract

We study platform workers' willingness to pay for social protection – in the form of sick pay and paid holiday – distinguishing between workers who entered platform work out of economic necessity (the "pushed") and those attracted by its flexibility and advantages (the "pulled"). Using a discrete-choice experiment administered to approximately 800 taxi, cleaning, and delivery platform workers in Germany, Italy, and Poland, we find that average willingness to pay amounts to 0.9% of earnings for sick pay and 2.1% for paid holiday. Preferences, however, differ sharply by motivational orientation: pushed workers are willing to forgo on average 3.8% of earnings for paid holidays, while pulled workers' valuations are substantially lower and, in most specifications, statistically indistinguishable from zero. This divergence is robust across educational groups, income dependence on platforms, country, and current access to benefits, and is not accounted for by the demographic composition of the two groups. The findings suggest that the welfare impact of extending social protections to platform workers – as envisaged by the EU Platform Work Directive – might depend on the share of necessity-driven workers in the platform workforce.

Keywords: platform work, willingness to pay, discrete choice experiment, social protection, job quality

JEL: J32, J28, J81

^{*} We thank Karolien Lenaerts and Jakob Schmidhäuser for their help with the project. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon Europe Research and Innovation Programme under grant agreement No. 101061388 (project WeLaR). The usual disclaimers apply. All errors are ours.

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1. Introduction

Digital platform work has expanded rapidly over the last decade, intensifying debates about employment classification, working conditions, and the appropriate scope of labour market regulation. Workers who provide on-demand, app-mediated services are frequently classified as independent contractors or engaged through highly non-standard arrangements (Urzi Brancati et al., 2020). While platform work is often a paradigmatic form of flexible earning – accessible “any time” and “on demand” – it also tends to come with inferior working conditions compared with standard employment, including weaker protections and greater income insecurity (de Groen et al., 2018; De Stefano, 2015; Wood et al., 2018).

This tension has become politically salient in Europe. After years of regulatory pressure and contested negotiations, in 2024 the EU has adopted the directive on improving working conditions in platform work which addresses concerns that platform workers often lack core labour standards such as sick pay, minimum wage, or paid holidays (Forde et al., 2017; Muszyński et al., 2022). Yet, since platform workers benefit from the flexibility that gig economy offers (M. K. Chen et al., 2019), it may attract people who value flexible work arrangements and are willing to accept lower security in exchange for higher net earnings. An important question is how heterogeneous are strategies, benefits, and risks of workers engaged in platform economy out of necessity as opposed to those attracted to it by opportunities it offers, and whether these differences translate into preferences towards social protection.

In this paper, we answer this question through a tailored survey of taxi and delivery platform workers in Germany, Italy, and Poland. We distinguish between workers forced to work on platforms because of push factors such as lack of income or alternative job opportunities, and those attracted to platform work by flexibility and other opportunities. We use a discrete-choice experiment to elicit their preferences for two amenities typically provided in employment relationships thanks to social protection regulations, namely sick pay and paid holidays. Using the willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates, we evaluate differences in preferences for introducing such amenities in platform work between the subgroups of workers forced to undertake platform work and those attracted to it.

The heterogeneity of workers’ preferences and expectations constitutes a core reality of platform economy. In the UK, most platform workers appear to support labour rights, trade unions, and co-determination, but these preferences vary across social groups (Beckmann et al., 2026; Martindale et al., 2024). Moreover, the extent of workers’ economic dependence on platform earnings shapes both risk exposure and the subjective experience of the job (Ilsøe et al., 2021). High degree of platform dependence is associated with greater distress, worse wellbeing outcomes (Guo et al., 2025) and lower job satisfaction (Schor et al., 2020). Platform work experience is also

perceived by employers as more valuable than unemployment but less useful than traditional employment (Adermon and Hensvik, 2022). These findings point to a broader hypothesis: regulatory preferences and welfare consequences are likely mediated by workers' outside options, i.e., by the ease with which platform work can be substituted, combined with other jobs, or exited altogether. Moreover, heterogeneity is co-produced by institutional context and platform architecture. Regulatory responses can further amplify this variation: for instance, the introduction of a standard contract in one of the food delivery companies in Italy strengthened protections, yet its fit and consequences differed across workers depending on their dependence and availability (Bonifacio and Marcolin, 2024). Algorithmic ranking, task allocation, and monitoring can affect earnings volatility and sanction exposure, while migration status, the right to work, or language barriers can constrain bargaining power and raise the costs of exit, shaping both experiences and preferences (Maury, 2023).

While qualitative and quantitative research have richly documented platform working conditions and job quality (Kowalik et al., 2025; Martindale et al., 2024; Vieira, 2023; Wood et al., 2025), such studies often ask what amenities workers want, without systematically examining the trade-offs they are willing to make to obtain them. This distinction matters because preferences operate under constraints, which is why discrete-choice designs have been used to recover valuations of job amenities (Bustelo et al., 2022; Lewandowski et al., 2026; Mas and Pallais, 2017). For example, when "labour rights" (see Martindale et al., 2024) are operationalised as compulsory social insurance, many self-employed platform workers in Germany reject the idea, despite acknowledging risks and vulnerabilities (Beckmann et al., 2024). Survey evidence from Germany identifies distinct clusters of platform workers with different protection preferences, with implied willingness to pay for social protection ranging from 2% to 20% of platform income (Beckmann et al., 2026). This indicates a potential gap between declarative support for "more rights" and the monetised value workers attach to once trade-offs are made explicit.

A natural place to look for the sources of heterogeneity in such trade-offs is workers' motivations for entering platform work. Autonomy and flexibility are core drivers of platform participation (W.-C. Chen et al., 2019; Prassl, 2018) and broader sociological accounts locate platform work within workers' varied life situations and employment histories (Maury, 2024). Different outcomes are expected depending on whether people undertake platform work because of its attractive features – such as flexibility and the opportunities offered ("pull" factors) – or because workers have scarce alternative employment options, with financial necessity and lack of income being the primary drivers ("push" factors). Evidence from Poland suggests that a substantial share of taxi and delivery workers entered gig economy out of necessity (Kowalik et al., 2025). Ethnographic research on delivery work also documents platform labour as a strategy to avoid unemployment or exclusionary conditions shaped by language

barriers, limited social networks, and discrimination (Newlands, 2022). More generally, workers may sort into platform work where offline opportunities are worse and local employability is low (Zwysen and Piasna, 2024a).

Within this conceptual framework, we study how platform workers' valuations of job amenities vary with the factors that drew them to platform work. We rely on a pre-registered, stated-preference survey experiments among platform workers in three large European countries with distinct institutional contexts: Germany, Italy, and Poland. We focus on the on-site platform workers in transport, delivery, and cleaning, and study the heterogeneity of their preferences, given their socioeconomic characteristics, and differentiating between push and pull factors. The main advantage of applying a discrete-choice experiment in the job-offer context is the comparison of workers' decisions when different job amenities are available. Due to the general scarcity of information on platform workers, our survey on job preferences offers one of the most substantial datasets currently available in the European context.

Our study makes three main contributions. First, we advance comparative research on platform labour by offering an operationalisable method to measure push and pull factors. While motivations and flexibility have been examined to explain participation in platform work (W.-C. Chen et al., 2019; Prassl, 2018; Vallas and Schor, 2020), push factors remain less systematically analysed (with the exception of Zwysen and Piasna, 2024a). We find substantial country variation. For 18.2% of Polish platform workers push motivations outweigh pull motivations, whereas in Italy and Germany these shares amount to around 30%. As the composition of platform workers in terms of factors behind engaging in gig economy differs between European countries, the context for the regulation of platform work in particular countries likely differs too.

Second, we demonstrate that differences in push-pull motivations are strongly associated with gaps in actual working conditions and worker profiles, even after accounting for demographic characteristics. Workers who were mostly "pushed" work, on average, 8.2 hours more per week than workers who were "pulled". The former are more economically dependent on platform work, with platform earnings accounting for an additional 9.4 pp. of their total income compared with pulled workers. They also report lower job satisfaction.

Third, we show that workers' valuations of social protection arrangements are structured by push-pull motivations. Workers who were pushed to platform work value such amenities much more than pulled workers: the former are willing to forego 2.8% of their earnings for sick pay, and 3.8% for paid holidays (both values statistically significant at the 1% level), whereas the latter are willing to give up only 1.4% for holidays and no significant amount for sick pay. This pattern is consistent with the idea that when platform work is difficult to exit due to weak outside options, the value of security rises because it protects income continuity and predictability. These findings connect to

broader evidence of substantial preference heterogeneity in the valuation of social protection¹. Moreover, pushed workers express high WTP for these benefits especially often. In the full sample, the top decile show WTP levels above 7.9% of earnings for sick pay and 12.3% for paid holiday. Among pushed workers, however, 24.6% report WTP above such a sick-pay cut-off and 19.9% report WTP above such a paid-holiday cut-off. Thus, a substantial minority of those involuntarily engaged in platform work are prepared to accept considerable income losses in exchange for basic social protections. In line with the outside option hypothesis (Ghorpade et al., 2024), workers without access to paid leave or sick pay exhibit higher valuations in the full sample. However, even among individuals who do have access to these benefits (perhaps thanks to other, standard job), pushed workers assign substantially higher valuations than their pulled counterparts. This suggests that for involuntary gig workers, direct experience with social protection heightens rather than substitutes their demand – pushed workers appear more aware of both their value and the circumstances in which they become necessary.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional settings of the countries included in the survey. Section 3 describes the data, sampling strategy, and the description of the experimental framework. Section 4 presents our results on differences in motivations, working conditions, and willingness to pay for job amenities. Section 5 concludes by discussing implications the design of social protection policies that can accommodate heterogeneity without entrenching inequality.

2. Context and institutional settings

Germany, Italy, and Poland provide analytically useful cases for comparison, as major European economies located in different regions and embedded in distinct labour-market and welfare-state traditions. However, they share a common feature: platform work is not fully regulated under dedicated law or fully incorporated into the standard employment framework in any of these countries. Platform workers, who constitute 3-9% of the working age population (15-64) depending on the country (Table 1), are predominantly classified outside standard employment contracts and therefore lack statutory access to the social protection provisions that employees take for granted. In particular, employees in all three countries are entitled to paid sick leave and paid holiday, whereas self-employed platform workers – the dominant contractual category – have no automatic access to either benefit. Hence, platform workers' access to common job amenities, such as paid leave and sick pay, remains incomplete and uneven, depending on workers' employment status and contractual arrangements.

¹ Adams-Prassl et al. (2023) show 50% of workers were not willing to accept earnings lower by 2%, but as much as 30% of workers would forgo 20% of earnings for it.

Table 1. Platform work prevalence and statutory access to work benefits, by contract type

	Germany	Italy	Poland
Platform workers (% working age population)	~4–6%	~4–9%	~3%
Sick pay – employees	100% of wage	100% (3 days), then 75%	80% of wage
Sick pay – self-employed	Voluntary contributions	Generally none	Voluntary contributions
Paid leave – employees	Yes, ≥20 days	Yes, ≥20 days	Yes, 20–26 days
Paid leave – self-employed	No	No	No
Dominant contract form	Self-employed	Self-employed employee-like (couriers)	Self-employed / civil law contracts
Dedicated platform work legislation regarding employment status	No (case-law only)	Partial (Decrees 81/2015, 62/2026 + EU Directive)	No (taxi sector only)

Sources: Eurostat - *ad hoc* module of LFS in 2022; ETUC Country Reports; Fairwork (2024); Costantino and Gangemi (2025); Mika and Polkowska (2022).

In Poland, platform work remains largely unregulated. Most platform workers are engaged either as formally self-employed or through intermediaries under civil law contracts (*umowy cywilnoprawne*), a category that sits outside the labour code and carries no statutory entitlement to sick pay or paid leave. The first legislative attempt in 2016 required workers to register as self-employed to limit tax evasion, which in practice facilitated the spread of intermediary companies and further obscured employment relationships. Subsequent legislation has focused narrowly on the taxi sector (the 2020 Lex Uber law), while broader conditions for platform workers have remained absent from policy debate (Mika and Polkowska, 2022).

In Germany, no dedicated law governs platform work, but existing labour and social security legislation is applied on a case-by-case basis. The 2020 ruling of the Federal Labour Court (*Bundesarbeitsgericht*) established that delivery platform riders could be classified as employees under conditions of sufficient control. Yet, the vast majority of platform workers remain classified as self-employed. As a result, they fall outside collective bargaining coverage and must make voluntary contributions to access any sick pay insurance. Paid leave is similarly not available to self-employed workers under standard provisions.

In Italy, the regulatory framework has been more proactive. Legislative Decree No. 81/2015 extended certain employment-like protections to couriers performing continuous, personally executed work organised by the client, particularly in urban goods delivery. The circular 9 (April 2025) of the Italian Ministry of Labour and the new legislative decree 62/2026 paved the way to the implementation of Directive (EU) 2024/2831 on platform work. Specifically, Decree 62/2026 tightened the regulatory framework. This decree does not automatically reclassify all platform workers as employees, but it introduces a structured test and a set of obligations that substantially narrow the space for bogus self-employment in platform-mediated work.

3. Data and methodology

3.1. Recruitment methods

Given the institutional settings, we focus on job attributes that platform workers generally lack in all countries covered – holiday pay and sick pay. We refer to the collected data as the Platform Workers' Preferences Survey (PWPS). Data collection took place between January and July 2025.

We used multiple methods to recruit platform workers and collect data. First, we collected data via Facebook advertisements.² To recruit platform workers, we set up country-specific Facebook pages. Following the procedure described by Martindale et al. (2024), we targeted platform workers with key interests such as “electronic vehicle” and “Uber”, and occupations such as “Courier” and “Taxi Driver”. In each country, we fine-tuned the filters to capture country-specific platforms.³ We stratified the campaigns to four different populations – male taxi drivers, female taxi drivers, male couriers, and female couriers. Besides the national languages (Polish, German, and Italian), we have translated the survey ads and questionnaires into English, Ukrainian and Russian to reflect the significant role of migrants in the platform work. As the platform economy is predominantly male, we allocated 70% of our advertising budget to reach male platform workers. The part of the survey conducted via Facebook was not incentivised. We collected 169 responses using the Facebook advertisements. Second, we recruited participants via a survey company, Norstat, which collected 608 observations in three countries. We used a filtering question: “In the last 12 months, have you worked for any of these platforms?”⁴. These respondents were incentivised in line with survey company policy. The chosen alternatives are distributed evenly between the Facebook and Norstat samples (see Appendix Table A1). Therefore, we analyse a pooled sample from both data collection methods.

3.2. Experimental framework

A discrete-choice experiment (DCE) is a well-established method in labour economics to measure the preferences for different work arrangements (Lewandowski et al., 2026; Mas and Pallais, 2017; Van Landeghem et al., 2024). Compared to observational data, DCE allows randomising the characteristics of a specific good, such as a job offer, and observing individual choices under different conditions. DCE outperforms other valuation methods within the labour economics setting, and the estimated parameters are consistent with economic theory (Feld et al., 2022).

² The pilot ran from 29 January to 5 February 2025. We collected 25 responses, validated and revised the survey on this basis.

³ For instance, in Poland, the Just Eat/Takeaway platform is called “Pyszne.pl”.

⁴ Amazon Flex, Bolt, Deliveroo, DoorDash, Foodora, Getir, Glovo, Gorillas, Just Eat / Lieferando, Uber, Uber Eats, Wolt.

We exploit the variation in choice attributes to estimate platform workers' preferences toward sick pay and holiday pay coverage.⁵ Since our specification involves a monetary attribute – the (randomised) income loss associated with receiving a given job amenity – we can express workers' preferences toward amenities in terms of their willingness to forego wages to obtain these. Standard register data and large representative surveys do not include the alternatives individuals consider, making it difficult to determine which job characteristics matter. This problem is particularly understudied in the context of platform workers, who are often not included in conventional datasets.

The preferences assessment involved screening different potential choices, with two competing choice sets and the status quo alternative⁶ (Figure 1). We made our choice experiment simple to avoid exhausting workers' cognitive resources and ensure the high reliability of the collected data. Each participant screened five sets (two alternatives) of job offers, which differed regarding access to sick leave, holiday pay, and earnings loss from extending access to workers' benefits (Table 2).

Table 2. Choice attributes levels

Attribute	Type	Levels
Access to paid leave	nominal	Yes, No, status quo
Access to sick-pay	nominal	Yes, No, status quo
Earnings loss	discrete	-15%, -12%, -9%, -6%, -3%, 0

Source: Own elaboration.

Since our survey sample size is limited due to the narrow, hard-to-reach population we study, we used an optimal design framework to ensure that the collected responses provide a maximum amount of information about the choices.⁷ Using the procedure and software of Traets et al. (2020), we generated the DCE design using an efficient design with zero priors. We use the Modified Fedorov Algorithm for Mixed-level choice models to extract the optimal design for the DCE. After collecting pilot data, we updated the priors and generated the DCE design again to maximise the Fisher information. We assigned respondents to different groups and provided them with different choice sets to yield the most comprehensive comparisons. In total, there are 10 choice sets shown to respondents, which remains within the standard interval according to the literature (Oehlmann et al., 2017). These two choice sets did not differ in the data-generating process and yielded similar expected D-error.

⁵ We intentionally omit other benefits, such as unemployment and health insurance, as country-specific legal frameworks govern them and are usually not subject to change through collective bargaining agreements.

⁶ The choice card presented to respondents is provided for reference in the Appendix (Figure A1)

⁷ In our setting, there are 20 job offers, so comparing every potential offer would yield 190 unique choice cards in the full-factorial design.

In the survey, we also collected data on respondents' socio-demographic characteristics, job satisfaction, income, platform work type, and other factors (see detailed descriptions in Table 3).

Table 3. Contextual information collected on platform workers

Variable	Type	Levels
Frequency of working in the platform economy in the past 12 months	nominal	Never, Once, Less than once a month,
Employment type	nominal	Employee, self-employment, Other
Reasons behind taking up a gig job	nominal	• Lack of other job opportunities, • Loss of (all or part of) household income, • Flexibility in choosing working time, • "I like this kind of job", • Easy recruitment process and the swift start of working, • Willingness to earn some extra money
Is the platform the main source of income?	binary	Yes, No
Share of income obtained from platform work	numeric	0-100%
Hours worked in the platform economy	numeric	0-80+
Weekly net income obtained from platform work	numeric	
Entitled to sick pay? Entitled to holiday pay?	binary	Yes, No
Accidents at work encountered	nominal	Traffic accident, Verbal or physical abuse, Other forms of violence or danger, None
Job satisfaction	ordinal	Not at all satisfied, Not very satisfied, Satisfied, Very satisfied

Source: Own elaboration.

We tested whether respondents systematically chose some alternatives (I, II, or Status Quo) over others, which could indicate non-engagement in completing the survey. We did not find such evidence, as at most in the case of the 3rd Choice Set, 60.4% of Facebook respondents chose alternative I (Appendix Table A1).

Our study, data collection, and experiment received ethics approvals from KU Leuven's Privacy and Ethics platform (decision PRET approval number: G-2024-8262-R2(MIN)). We pre-registered the experiment in the American Economic Association's registry for randomised controlled trials (RCT ID: AEARCTR-0013087).

3.3. Econometric specification

To quantify platform workers' preferences for sick pay and paid holiday, we estimate their willingness to pay (WTP), which expresses their valuation of these job amenities in monetary terms. We use the Random Utility Framework, which assumes that workers make rational choices with respect to different job amenities (Lancaster, 1966; McFadden, 2001). The utility function is hedonic and can be decomposed into the utilities derived from different job characteristics. Consequently, we can present the workers' preferences as an additive utility function:

$$U_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 SickPay_{ijt} + \beta_2 HolidayPay_{ijt} + \beta_3 IncomeLoss_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

where U_{ijt} refers to the utility from choosing j -th job offer by i -th individual in period t , and ε_{ijt} is a random component attributed to factors different from those specified.

However, since utility is unobserved, we recalculate the estimated parameters – β_k , for k different attributes – into the willingness-to-pay space, where each parameter is presented in monetary form. For instance, to derive the equivalent wage level with access to sick pay with no change in utility, equation (1) can be rewritten as:

$$dU = \beta_1 dSickPay + \beta_3 dEarningsLoss = 0 \quad (2)$$

and further rewritten as ratio:

$$\frac{d IncomeLoss}{d SickPay} = -\frac{\beta_1}{\beta_3} = WTP \quad (3)$$

This translates into estimating the marginal rates of substitution of (non-monetary) job amenities for the earnings loss. These recalculated parameters represent the implicit prices of different (non-monetary) job characteristics. We use a Random Parameter Mixed Logistic model (RP-MIXL) in the estimation. The model allows for respondent-specific preferences – β_{ik} – and for flexible substitution patterns, as new alternatives are added to the choice set.

In the RP-MIXL framework, estimated coefficients for amenities are expected to follow some defined distribution and are considered in the same sense as random variables, where each specific beta is β_{ik} is drawn from this distribution. For all work attributes, we use a random normal distribution. We compute the mean WTP for sick pay and holiday pay across various subgroups using a partially analytical, partially simulation-based method based on the delta method, which has been shown to be computationally less demanding and to provide consistent results even in small samples (Scaccia et al., 2023). As each respondent makes repeated choices, our data are panel data.

We examine heterogeneity across split samples, focusing first on differences related to workers' "push" and "pull" factors for entering platform work. Respondents were asked about their reasons for taking up platform work. We

classify “lack of other job opportunities” and “loss of all or part of household income” as push factors. In turn, “flexibility in choosing working time”, preference for this type of job (“I like this kind of job”), “easy recruitment process and the swift start of working”, and “willingness to earn some extra money” are classified as pull factors.

We operationalise being “pushed” as a function of the relative balance between push (necessity-driven) and pull (preference-driven) factors behind entering platform work. For each respondent i , we computed:

$$C_i = P_i - 0.5 L_i$$

where P_i is the count of reported push factors and L_i is the count of reported pull factors. Pull factors were down-weighted by a factor of 0.5 to adjust for the unequal number of available items in the questionnaire, as respondents could choose from four pull factors but only two push factors. Respondent with a positive score ($C_i > 0$) were coded as pushed.

We acknowledge that DCEs may be subject to hypothetical bias, as these are stated preferences, and, in real-life circumstances, people may behave differently (Whitehead et al., 2016). In particular, the WTP may be overestimated and is sometimes referred to as the maximum price that one is willing to pay, but not the one that maximises individual utility (List and Gallet, 2001; Schmidt and Bijmolt, 2020). The theories behind WTP estimation using stated preferences emphasise that bias also arises from uncertainty. However, these issues are arguably less of a concern in our setting. Platform workers often switch between platforms, looking for the most preferred working conditions, so a choice among job offers as in our survey is less abstract for them. Mas and Pallais (2017) showed that DCEs and fieldwork experiments provide consistent estimates of workers' preferences. Wiswall and Zafar (2018) and Lewandowski et al. (2026) found that stated preferences regarding job outcomes strongly predict real choices made afterwards, especially regarding job amenities and forms of work.

4. Results

3.1 Descriptive evidence

In all countries, most of the surveyed platform workers are men, young or prime-aged, and do not have a university degree (Table 4). In Italy, women account for 45% of the sample, the highest share of all countries.

The socio-demographic structure of our sample resembles that of platform workers in Europe, as established by the cross-country Internet and Platform Work Survey (IPWS), conducted in 2022 (Zwysen and Piasna, 2024b), and country-specific surveys. Compared to the IPWS, our sample includes a slightly higher proportion of men, a greater share of individuals with higher education, and a higher share aged 30-49 (see Table A2 in the Appendix). It is worth noting that the IPWS' country sample sizes were smaller than ours. In Germany, the PWPS sample is slightly younger than the population surveyed by Beckmann et al. (2024), and the share of migrants is markedly lower (18.2% vs. 36%). In Poland, compared to the Polish Platform Work Survey (PPWS, see Kowalik et al., 2025) conducted in 2021, workers in our sample are slightly older and more educated. In addition, our sample includes a higher share of female workers (23.1% vs. 10%) and a lower share of migrants (9.7% vs. 36%). Regarding Italy, the INAPP-PLUS data⁸ on Italian platform workers used by Cirillo et al. (2023) show a similar gender composition compared to our sample (46% versus 44.9% women in the INAPP PLUS and ours, respectively; see Table A2 in the Appendix). The proportion of migrants among total respondents is also comparable (2% versus 5.9% in the INAPP-PLUS and our sample, respectively). However, our Italian sample displays a higher percentage of highly educated workers (41.7% versus 16%) and older workers (23.2% versus 10%), while younger workers are under-represented (15.8% versus 45%).

Nearly a quarter of respondents (24.6%) report working on platforms every day, whereas about one-fifth (22%) do so less than once a month. On average, respondents earn 51% of their income on platforms. However, the degree of reliance on platform work differs markedly within and across countries (Figure 2). In Germany and Italy, the sample is more heterogeneous in terms of the share of income derived from platform work. In Poland, by contrast, respondents appear to rely on platform work to a much greater extent. The share of platform workers who derive 90-100% of their income from platforms is nearly three times higher in Poland (35%) than in Italy or Germany (12%

⁸ The VIII wave of the Participation, Labour, Unemployment, Survey developed and administered by the National Institute for the Analysis of Public Policies in Italy (hereafter INAPP-PLUS survey), included in 2018 an ad-hoc module on internet and platform workers. Excluding a very small minority of internet workers—those performing online activities such as completing surveys or data entry—and non respondents (29 individuals in total), the sample size of platform workers included in the INAPP-PLUS survey is 212 individuals (see Cirillo et al., 2023, Table 1 and footnote 6).

each). Employment status varies markedly across countries: while the majority of German respondents work as employees (80.2%) and Italy shows a more balanced split between employees non-employees (62.5% and 37.5% respectively), Poland stands out with only one fourth of respondents (24.8%) falling into employee category - a pattern consistent with the prevalence of non-standard subcontracting structures documented in the Polish platform economy (Fairwork, 2024).


Table 4. Sample structure of the Platform Workers' Preferences Survey (in %)

Variable	Germany	Italy	Poland	Total
<i>Gender</i>				
Men	67.1	55.1	76.9	66.0
Women	32.9	44.9	23.1	34.0
<i>Age group</i>				
18-29	19.0	15.8	32.0	22.0
30-49	59.3	61.0	46.6	55.9
50 and above	21.7	23.2	21.5	22.1
<i>Education</i>				
Non-university	52.3	58.3	51.2	54.1
University	47.7	41.7	48.8	45.9
<i>Platform type</i>				
Delivery courier	74.8	69.9	45.3	63.7
Taxi/ride-hailing	41.5	35.3	50.6	42.2
Cleaning/household	18.6	21.3	17.8	19.3
<i>Migrant status</i>				
Yes	18.2	5.9	9.7	11.2
No	81.8	94.1	90.3	88.8
<i>Has access to paid leave</i>				
Yes	42.2	59.9	76.1	59.2
No	57.8	40.1	23.9	40.8
<i>Has access to sick pay</i>				
Yes	44.2	57.0	68.0	56.2
No	55.8	43.0	32.0	43.8
<i>Platform work-related incident</i>				
Yes	50.0	40.8	33.6	41.6
No	50.0	59.2	66.4	58.4
<i>Economically dependent on platform work</i>				
Yes	43.4	40.1	48.6	43.9
No	56.6	59.9	51.4	56.1
<i>Employment status</i>				
Employee	80.2	62.5	24.8	56.6
Self-employed or non-standard contracts	19.8	37.5	75.2	43.4
N	258	272	247	777
Share of total sample (%)	33.2	35.0	31.8	100.0

Note: Percentages in the platform type category do not add up to 100% because respondents could select multiple options.

Source: own calculations based on PWPS.

Figure 2. Share of income earned on platforms by country




Note: Each bar shows the percentage of workers within the group whose income from platform work falls in the respective 10 percentage-point interval. Pushed workers (red) are those for whom push factors outweigh pull factors ($neg_pos_ratio > 0$). Source: own calculations based on PWPS.

4.2. Who's pushed into platform work?

Next, we examine the reasons for engaging in platform work. The need for flexibility was reported by 51.5% of workers in the full sample. By contrast, only 19.4% of respondents reported loss of income (see Table A3 in the Appendix). Overall, 83.9% of respondents mentioned at least one pull factor, and 44.4% at least one push factor. However, there were notable cross-country differences (Figure 3). In Poland, 89.5% of respondents reported at least one pull factor, while the lowest share was in Italy (78.3%). By contrast, the share of respondents reporting at least one push factor was the highest in Germany (50.4%) and the lowest in Poland (38.1%). Workers for whom push motivations outweigh pull motivations are classified as "pushed". Overall, 29.2% can be regarded as such, with the shares particularly high in Germany (34.9%) and Italy (33.8%), and lower in Poland (18.2%).

Figure 3. Share of respondents citing any push or pull factor as a reason behind starting platform work



Note: Pushed workers report more push than pull factors. Source: own calculations based on PWPS.

Next, we run a logistic regression to assess the correlates of being pushed into platform work (Table 5), controlling for age, gender, being a migrant, university education, country of residence, access to sick pay, access to paid holidays, economic dependence on platform (defined as platforms accounting for more than 50% of total earnings), having experienced an accident or violent incident in the platform work, and employment status⁹. The results show that country of residence is a strong predictor of the pushed status: platform workers in Germany and Italy are approximately 13 percentage points (pp.) more likely to be pushed into platform work than their counterparts in Poland ($p < 0.01$). Workers with higher education are 7.7 pp less likely to be pushed compared to those without it ($p < 0.05$), suggesting that more qualified workers more often engage in platform work by choice. Economic dependence on platform income is positively associated with being pushed into platform work (likelihood higher by 8.0 pp, $p < 0.05$), as is having experienced an accident or violent incident in the platform work (8.6 pp, $p < 0.05$). Gender, migrant status, employment status and access to employment benefits are not significantly associated with pushed status¹⁰.

⁹ The binary variable contrasts employees (0) with those holding self-employed or other non-standard contracts (1), where the latter category was collected via an open-ended response field. Reported examples include fixed-term service contracts, car rental agreements, and arrangements with no formal contract. The frequency of the "other" category varies across countries — from zero in Germany and 3.7% in Italy to 47.9% in Poland.

¹⁰ In the further analysis of workers' WTP we do not stratify by self-reported employment status (employee and non-employees) for two reasons. First, the categories are not cross-nationally comparable: what constitutes an employment contract differs across Germany, Italy, and Poland, so identical responses may reflect meaningfully different legal arrangements. Second, self-reported status may not reliably capture actual working conditions. Platform firms often use subcontracting arrangements in which formal contracts are frequently inaccessible, do not govern the working relationship in practice, and leave many workers unable to accurately identify their own legal status (Fairwork 2024, 2026).

Table 5. Factors associated with being a worker pushed into platform work: average marginal effects

Age (ref.: 18–24)	
25–29	-0.065 (0.063)
30–34	0.055 (0.062)
35–39	0.075 (0.062)
40–44	0.030 (0.063)
45–49	0.058 (0.067)
50–54	0.180** (0.074)
55–59	0.096 (0.080)
60 or older	-0.040 (0.075)
Female	0.003 (0.034)
University education (ref. secondary or lower education)	-0.077** (0.033)
Migrant	-0.037 (0.050)
Country (ref.: Poland)	
Germany	0.130*** (0.041)
Italy	0.133*** (0.039)
Has access to paid holidays	-0.050 (0.042)
Has access to sick pay	-0.011 (0.040)
Work-related incident	0.086** (0.035)
Platform income > 50% of total	0.080** (0.034)
Self-employed or non-standard employment	0.005 (0.040)
Number of observations	777

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: pushed = 1 if push factors outweigh pull factors (*neg_pos_ratio* > 0). Reference categories: age 18–24, no university education (ISCED 0–4), Poland, employment contract; *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Source: own estimations based on PWPS.

Workers pushed into platform work differ from those pulled to it in terms of working conditions and economic dependence on platforms. Using OLS regressions and controlling for age, gender, university education, migrant background, and country fixed effects (Table 6), we find that, on average, pushed workers work on platforms 8.2 hours more per week than pulled workers ($p < 0.001$), consistent with greater economic dependence on platform income: the share of total earnings derived from platform work is 9.4 pp. higher among pushed workers ($p < 0.001$). Regarding job satisfaction, pushed workers are 11.6 pp. less likely to be satisfied than pulled workers ($p < 0.01$).

Table 6. Differences between pushed and pulled platform workers

Outcome	Pushed (coef.)	N
Hours worked per week	8.225*** (1.594)	764
Job satisfaction (binary)	-0.116*** (0.039)	754
Income share from platform (%)	9.436*** (2.274)	777


*Note: OLS estimates (hours and income) and AME from logit model (job satisfaction) with robust standard errors in parentheses. The coefficient on Pushed captures the difference relative to pulled workers (reference category). Controls: age groups, female, university education, migrant status, country fixed effects (reference: Poland). Pushed = neg_pos_ratio > 0 (push factors outweigh pull factors). Job satisfaction recoded binary: 3-4 satisfied, 1-2 unsatisfied. N differs between regressions due to missing values for hours and job satisfaction. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.*

Source: own estimations based on PWPS.

4.3. Willingness to pay for sick pay and holiday leave

Moving to workers' preferences for job amenities as expressed in the discrete-choice experiment, we find that 13.9% of individuals never chose to give up a part of their earnings to obtain either sick pay or paid leave, while 3% always traded some income for sick pay coverage, 5.4% for paid leave coverage, and 14.8% for having access to both (Figure 4). These values reflect high heterogeneity in workers' preferences regarding social protection and amenities. We also find some differences between countries, as 18.6% of platform workers in Poland chose to never forgo income for any amenity, compared to 11% in Italy and 12.4% in Germany. By contrast, in Italy, 19.9% of workers always decided to forgo income for both paid holiday and sick pay, compared to 10.1% in Germany, and 14.2% in Poland.

Figure 4. Respondents' choices, conditional on available sick pay and paid leave in the choice set



Note: Shares of respondents by choice pattern. "Always decides to forgo income for both paid holiday and sick pay" denotes respondents who consistently chose the alternative with both sick pay and paid holiday, regardless of the income cost; "Always decides to forgo income for paid holiday" and "Always decides to forgo income for sick pay" denote those who consistently prioritised one benefit only; "Never decides to forego income" denotes respondents who never selected an item with the attributed cost. Remaining respondents (not shown) exhibit mixed choice

Source: own calculations based on PWPS.

Next, we use the estimated distributions of willingness-to-pay values to quantify platform workers' perceived benefits from sick pay and paid holiday rights. Table 7 presents WTP estimates both for the pooled sample and for workers who were pushed into platform work by lack of income or other job opportunities, as opposed to workers who were pulled to it by flexibility. To this aim, we interact preference parameters (sick pay, holiday) with the indicator variable for workers pushed into platform work. This specification allows both the mean and the variance of WTP to differ freely between the two groups, and the statistical significance of the differences between groups is assessed by Wald tests on the interaction terms. Focusing on differences between pushed and pulled workers allows identifying groups with contrasting preferences towards social security in platform economy.

In the sample pooled across three countries, the average WTP amounts to 0.9% for sick pay and 2.1% for paid holidays, both expressed in terms of foregone earnings (Table 7). Among pushed workers, the valuations are slightly higher, as they are willing to forgo on average 2.8% of earnings to gain access to sick pay and 3.8% to gain paid holiday entitlement. In contrast, pulled workers' WTP for sick pay is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero, while their WTP for paid holiday, though statistically significant, is substantially lower (1.4%). The differences between groups are statistically significant, as confirmed by the Wald test (sick pay: $\chi^2(1) = 13.35$, $p < 0.001$; holiday: $\chi^2(1) = 8.09$, $p = 0.004$). Among pushed workers, 24.6% exhibit a WTP for sick pay above the 90th percentile of the full-sample distribution, and 19.9% do so for paid holiday; while the corresponding shares among pulled workers

are only 7.2% and 7.5%, respectively. Moreover, the share of workers unwilling to sacrifice any earnings for social protections (a non-positive WTP) is noticeably lower among pushed workers, amounting to 35.7% in the case of sick pay and 35.4% in the case of holiday pay, while the corresponding shares among the pulled workers equal 49.5% and 42.5%, respectively. The greater dispersion of a WTP among pushed workers suggests they are not a homogeneous group: while their average valuations are markedly higher, a substantial share holds preferences close to those of pulled workers, alongside a sizeable minority with very strong demand for social protections.

The country-level results indicate that the divergence between pushed and pulled workers is the largest in Italy and Poland. In Italy, pushed workers' WTP for sick pay (5.0%) significantly exceeds that of pulled workers (0.1%), a difference confirmed by the Wald test ($\chi^2(1) = 9.69$, $p = 0.002$); the WTP for paid holiday is also substantially higher among pushed workers (7.0% vs. 3.5%), though the group difference is significant only at the 10% level ($p = 0.062$). In Poland, pushed workers exhibit a significantly higher WTP for sick pay (4.7% vs. 0.6%, Wald test: $\chi^2(1) = 8.74$, $p = 0.003$), while the difference in the WTP for paid holiday (3.7% vs. 1.4%) is not statistically significant ($p = 0.173$). In both countries, the shares of workers with very high WTP for social security arrangements (in the 10th deciles of pooled distributions) are also noticeably higher among workers pushed into platform work. In Germany, however, the average WTPs for sick pay and paid holiday are not statistically significant. While they are higher among the pushed workers than among those pulled, neither are statistically significant in either group, and the Wald tests show no significant pushed–pulled differences.

Table 7. Willingness to pay for sick pay and paid holiday (% of income)

	N	WTP for sick pay		WTP for paid holiday		Share of workers with WTP for sick pay above (in %)		Share of workers with WTP for paid holiday above (in %)	
Group		Mean (95% CI)	SD (SE)	Mean (95% CI)	SD (SE)	> 0	> 9th decile (pooled, 7.9%)	> 0	> 9th decile (pooled, 12.3%)
Full population									
All	777	0.86** (0.14; 1.59)	5.52 (0.90)	2.08*** (1.14; 3.01)	7.96 (1.18)	56.2	10.0	60.3	10.0
Pushed	227	2.76*** (1.39; 4.13)	7.54 (1.46)	3.77*** (2.19; 5.35)	10.05 (1.78)	64.3	24.6	64.6	19.9
Pulled	550	0.07 (-0.78; 0.92)	5.40 (0.87)	1.43*** (0.39; 2.47)	7.52 (1.07)	50.5	7.2	57.5	7.5
Wald test		$\chi^2=13.35^{***}$ ($p=0.000$)		$\chi^2=8.09^{***}$ ($p=0.004$)					
Germany									
All	258	0.10 (-0.86; 1.05)	3.04 (1.17)	0.78 (-0.36; 1.91)	4.98 (1.17)	51.3	0.5	56.2	1.1
Pushed	90	0.46 (-1.13; 2.06)	3.21 (1.21)	1.64* (-0.06; 3.33)	5.54 (1.43)	55.7	1.0	61.6	2.7
Pulled	168	0.13 (-1.02; 1.28)	3.13 (1.22)	0.29 (-1.15; 1.74)	4.86 (1.13)	51.6	0.6	52.4	0.7
Wald test		$\chi^2=0.39$ ($p=0.534$)		$\chi^2=1.62$ ($p=0.203$)					
Italy									
All	272	1.56* (-0.16; 3.29)	7.94 (2.28)	4.65*** (1.98; 7.31)	14.40 (4.26)	57.8	21.1	62.6	29.8
Pushed	92	4.96*** (1.80; 8.11)	13.12 (4.74)	7.00*** (3.06; 10.94)	18.57 (6.32)	64.7	41.0	64.7	38.8
Pulled	180	0.12 (-1.91; 2.14)	6.89 (1.87)	3.52** (0.71; 6.33)	12.62 (3.64)	50.7	12.8	61.0	24.4
Wald test		$\chi^2=9.69^{***}$ ($p=0.002$)		$\chi^2=3.48^*$ ($p=0.062$)					
Poland									
All	247	1.28* (-0.05; 2.62)	6.65 (1.68)	1.69** (0.26; 3.11)	7.43 (1.85)	57.7	15.9	59.0	7.7
Pushed	45	4.71*** (1.69; 7.73)	10.96 (3.60)	3.72** (0.28; 7.17)	9.85 (3.36)	66.6	38.4	64.7	19.3
Pulled	202	0.55 (-0.86; 1.96)	6.50 (1.63)	1.37* (-0.15; 2.88)	7.38 (1.83)	53.4	12.8	57.4	7.0
Wald test		$\chi^2=8.74^{***}$ ($p=0.003$)		$\chi^2=1.85$ ($p=0.173$)					

Note: No case-level controls. Reference q90 from a full-sample income-random mixed logit without interaction terms, used as fixed thresholds across all specifications. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$. Pushed: $neg_pos_ratio > 0$.

Source: own estimations based on PWPS.

To assess whether the higher valuations observed among pushed workers reflect their motivation to secure social protections or merely the compositional characteristics of the pushed group (such as the greater representation of economically vulnerable workers), we estimate the WTP separately for three vulnerability subgroups: (i) those without university education, (ii) workers for whom platform work is their primary income source (economically dependent workers), and (iii) workers who have experienced a work-related accident. We focus on characteristics significantly correlated with the likelihood of being pushed into platform work (Table 5). For completeness, we also estimate WTP for the opposites of these groups, namely those with a university degree, those with primary source of income other than platform work, and those who did not experience a work-related accident. Additionally, we also compare pushed and pulled workers in subpopulations who declare already having access to sick pay and holiday pay, and those who lack these amenities. Table 8 reports WTP estimates and distributional statistics for each subgroup and the corresponding non-vulnerable group, separately for pushed and pulled workers.

Pushed workers exhibit substantially higher willingness to pay for paid holiday than their pulled counterparts within the same subgroup in all six groups examined, and for sick pay in most (Table 8). This confirms that the attitudes toward social security arrangements are inherently different between groups with contrasting pathways to platform work (pushed vs. pulled), despite the pushed group including more workers structurally exposed to labour market risks, such as those without a university degree, those economically dependent on platform work, and those who experienced an incident. Indeed, the differences between pushed and pulled groups are noticeable among those particularly vulnerable populations. Moreover, among pushed workers in particular subgroups, WTP for sick pay tends to be lower than WTP for paid holiday, and the pushed–pulled difference in sick pay valuations is statistically significant in fewer subgroups than the corresponding divergence in holiday valuations. This confirms that platform workers generally value the right to paid holidays more than sick pay.

Among workers without a university degree, pushed workers report WTP for sick pay of 2.7% against 0.6% among pulled workers, and for paid holiday 4.5% against 1.9%. However, the differences are only marginally statistically significant (sick pay $p = 0.096$; paid holiday $p = 0.056$). Among economically dependent workers, the gap in the valuations of sick pay (3.1% vs. 0.2%) is statistically significant, though the corresponding gap in paid holiday valuations (2.8% vs. 1.3%) is not. Among workers who experienced a platform work related accident or violence incident, WTP for sick pay is near zero in both groups (pushed 1.3%, pulled 0.0%) and the Wald test confirms no statistically significant difference. WTP for paid holiday is higher among pushed workers (5.1% vs. 2.3%) but the difference likewise is not significant at 5% level. Taken together, the subgroup analysis provides consistent evidence that the pushed–pulled difference in WTP for social protections is not an artefact of group composition.

Among university-educated workers, pushed graduates report WTP for sick pay of 2.9% against 0.2% among pulled graduates – a gap confirmed by the Wald test at $p < 0.001$. Among non-dependent workers – those for whom platform earnings are not the primary income source – pushed workers' WTP for paid holiday (4.5%) nearly triples that of pulled workers (1.6%), the largest relative gap for holiday among groups where the difference is statistically significant. Workers who have not experienced a work-related accident show the largest absolute pushed–pulled gap for sick pay among the studies subgroups: pushed WTP reaches 3.6% against 0.3% among pulled workers.

The most interesting pattern emerges when we study the groups with and without access to paid leave and sick pay. Workers who lack access to a given benefit express broadly similar demand for it regardless of their motivation for platform work, but among workers who already hold some form of coverage, however, the value placed on formalising that protection diverges. Among workers who already have access to sick pay, pushed workers are willing to forgo 2.8 % of income for sick pay coverage, while pulled workers show no statistically significant WTP for this benefit (0.7%, $p > 0.10$). The pattern is even more pronounced for paid leave. Among workers with existing access, pushed workers' WTP reaches 3.4% for sick pay and 4.4% for paid holiday, compared to 0.4% and 1.0% among their pulled counterparts (Wald $p < 0.001$ and $p = 0.002$, respectively). By contrast, among workers who currently lack access to either benefit, the pushed/pulled distinction largely disappears. Workers without sick pay coverage show WTP of 2.71% (pushed) and 1.67% (pulled), and there is no significant difference between these two groups ($p = 0.41$); a similar pattern holds for those without paid leave access (2% vs. 1.3%, $p = 0.53$).

To sum up, pushed workers value labour market protections consistently more highly across heterogeneous subgroups. This strengthens our interpretation that motivation behind engaging in platform work is a substantive driver of preferences for social protection. Pulled workers, who have chosen platform employment more voluntarily, appear to view the absence of contractual guarantees on platforms as an acceptable trade-off for the flexibility. Pushed workers facing the same situation respond very differently: their high WTP suggests that existing access is perceived as precarious rather than secure, and that the formalisation of social protection would carry significant value because they probably feel less able to exit platform work.

Table 8. Willingness to pay for sick pay and paid holiday by subgroup (% of income; income-random mixed logit, no case-level controls; 95% CI)

	N	WTP for sick pay		WTP for paid holiday		Share of workers with WTP for sick pay above (%)		Share of workers with WTP for paid holiday above (%)	
Group		Mean (95 CI)	SD (SE)	Mean (95 CI)	SD (SE)	> 0	> 9th decile (7.9%)	> 0	> 9th decile (12.3%)
No university degree (ISCED 0-4)									
All	423	1.31** (0.05; 2.58)	7.16 (1.81)	2.78*** (1.11; 4.45)	10.78 (2.66)	57.3	17.7	60.2	18.9
Pushed	144	2.65** (0.48; 4.83)	9.12 (2.81)	4.50*** (1.97; 7.03)	13.70 (3.88)	61.4	28.1	62.9	28.5
Pulled	279	0.59 (-0.91; 2.09)	6.77 (1.63)	1.91* (-0.00; 3.82)	9.74 (2.34)	53.5	13.9	57.8	14.4
Wald test		$\chi^2=2.77^*$ ($p=0.096$)		$\chi^2=3.65^*$ ($p=0.056$)					
University degree (ISCED 5-8)									
All	354	0.53 (-0.34; 1.39)	4.52 (0.92)	1.57*** (0.50; 2.63)	6.25 (1.08)	54.6	5.1	59.9	4.3
Pushed	83	2.90*** (1.13; 4.67)	6.29 (1.49)	3.25*** (1.14; 5.36)	7.69 (1.68)	67.8	21.2	66.4	12.0
Pulled	271	0.19 (-0.79; 1.17)	4.44 (0.91)	1.12* (-0.03; 2.26)	6.08 (1.01)	51.7	4.0	57.3	3.3
Wald test		$\chi^2=11.78^{***}$ ($p=0.001$)		$\chi^2=3.86^{**}$ ($p=0.050$)					
Platform as main income source (>50)									
All	341	1.26* (-0.20; 2.72)	8.17 (1.93)	1.78** (0.20; 3.36)	8.90 (2.08)	56.1	20.7	57.9	11.9
Pushed	120	3.14** (0.67; 5.61)	10.43 (3.07)	2.85** (0.48; 5.21)	10.20 (2.75)	61.8	32.3	61.0	17.8
Pulled	221	0.24 (-1.45; 1.92)	7.74 (1.71)	1.25 (-0.65; 3.15)	8.46 (1.96)	51.2	16.0	55.9	9.6
Wald test		$\chi^2=4.59^{**}$ ($p=0.032$)		$\chi^2=1.28$ ($p=0.258$)					
Platform not main income source (≤50)									
All	436	0.66 (-0.13; 1.45)	3.94 (0.90)	2.29*** (1.12; 3.45)	7.41 (1.36)	56.7	3.2	62.1	8.9
Pushed	107	2.22*** (0.65; 3.79)	5.44 (1.40)	4.50*** (2.32; 6.67)	9.97 (2.25)	65.8	14.7	67.4	21.8
Pulled	329	0.14 (-0.79; 1.07)	3.95 (0.91)	1.62** (0.38; 2.85)	7.00 (1.22)	51.4	2.4	59.1	6.4
Wald test		$\chi^2=6.05^{**}$ ($p=0.014$)		$\chi^2=7.79^{***}$ ($p=0.005$)					
Experienced accident or violence in the platform work									
All	323	0.45 (-1.42; 2.32)	8.41 (2.34)	3.28*** (0.94; 5.63)	12.62 (3.81)	52.1	18.6	60.3	23.8
Pushed	120	1.31 (-1.61; 4.22)	9.08 (2.74)	5.09*** (1.76; 8.41)	15.95 (5.44)	55.7	23.3	62.5	32.6
Pulled	203	0.03 (-2.28; 2.34)	8.46 (2.37)	2.27 (-0.48; 5.03)	11.05 (3.38)	50.2	17.5	58.1	18.3
Wald test		$\chi^2=0.55$ ($p=0.456$)		$\chi^2=2.21$ ($p=0.137$)					

No accident or violence in the platform work									
All	454	1.06*** (0.28; 1.84)	4.76 (0.95)	1.80*** (0.79; 2.80)	6.83 (1.18)	58.8	7.4	60.4	6.2
Pushed	107	3.58*** (1.89; 5.27)	7.27 (1.71)	3.24*** (1.34; 5.14)	8.17 (1.71)	68.9	27.4	65.4	13.5
Pulled	347	0.27 (-0.58; 1.12)	4.38 (0.88)	1.36** (0.28; 2.44)	6.63 (1.11)	52.5	4.0	58.1	5.0
Wald test		$\chi^2=16.43^{***}$ ($p=0.000$)		$\chi^2=3.70^*$ ($p=0.054$)					
No access to sick pay									
All	340	2.01*** (0.56; 3.46)	7.27 (1.99)	2.28*** (0.70; 3.86)	8.13 (1.99)	60.9	20.7	61.0	11.0
Pushed	118	2.71** (0.51; 4.91)	8.28 (2.57)	3.36*** (1.02; 5.71)	9.68 (2.82)	62.8	26.4	63.6	17.9
Pulled	222	1.67* (-0.01; 3.36)	6.95 (1.93)	1.74* (-0.13; 3.60)	7.54 (1.83)	59.5	18.4	59.1	8.1
Wald test		$\chi^2=0.69$ ($p=0.406$)		$\chi^2=1.50$ ($p=0.220$)					
Has access to sick pay									
All	437	0.18 (-0.67; 1.03)	4.78 (0.99)	1.93*** (0.78; 3.09)	7.85 (1.43)	51.5	5.2	59.7	9.4
Pushed	109	2.76*** (0.98; 4.53)	6.84 (1.72)	4.15*** (1.95; 6.34)	10.23 (2.29)	65.7	22.4	65.7	21.3
Pulled	328	0.70 (-0.31; 1.72)	4.95 (1.08)	1.25** (0.01; 2.48)	7.46 (1.33)	55.7	7.2	56.6	7.0
Wald test		$\chi^2=14.04^{***}$ ($p=0.000$)		$\chi^2=6.98^{***}$ ($p=0.008$)					
No access to paid leave									
All	317	1.55** (0.17; 2.94)	5.96 (1.67)	2.58*** (0.94; 4.22)	7.69 (1.94)	60.3	14.2	63.1	10.4
Pushed	116	2.04** (0.05; 4.03)	6.55 (2.05)	3.08*** (0.85; 5.31)	8.40 (2.47)	62.2	18.4	64.3	13.7
Pulled	201	1.28 (-0.41; 2.97)	5.74 (1.64)	2.31** (0.35; 4.28)	7.38 (1.91)	58.8	12.3	62.3	8.8
Wald test		$\chi^2=0.39$ ($p=0.530$)		$\chi^2=0.35$ ($p=0.554$)					
Has access to paid leave									
All	460	0.51 (-0.33; 1.36)	5.28 (1.07)	1.81*** (0.69; 2.94)	8.00 (1.48)	53.9	8.0	59.0	9.6
Pushed	111	3.36*** (1.47; 5.25)	8.05 (2.01)	4.43*** (2.18; 6.69)	10.89 (2.48)	66.2	28.4	65.8	23.6
Pulled	349	0.38 (-0.58; 1.34)	5.20 (1.09)	1.03* (-0.14; 2.20)	7.45 (1.32)	52.9	7.3	55.5	6.6
Wald test		$\chi^2=15.25^{***}$ ($p=0.000$)		$\chi^2=9.29^{***}$ ($p=0.002$)					

Note: No case-level controls. Reference q90 from a full-sample income-random mixed logit without interaction terms, used as fixed thresholds across all specifications. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Source: own estimations based on PWPS.

4.4. Robustness checks

As the first robustness check, we re-estimate the effects for pushed and pulled workers by splitting the sample and fitting separate mixed logit models for each subgroup, rather than pooling observations and identifying differences through interaction terms. This approach allows all model parameters, including the variance of the random coefficients, to vary across groups, at the cost of reduced precision in smaller subsamples. Appendix Table A4 reports the resulting WTP estimates and distributional statistics.


The results align closely with those from the interaction approach reported in Tables 7 and 8 across most subgroups, providing support for the robustness of the main findings. For subgroups defined by worker characteristics – migrants, dependent workers, workers with and without accident experience – both approaches produce consistent conclusions. For Italy, the estimates are nearly identical: pushed workers' WTP for sick pay is 5.5% (vs. 5.0% in the interaction model) and for paid holiday 7.6% (vs. 7.0%), with pulled workers again near zero for sick pay and at 3.2% for holiday – both statistically significant. Germany continues to show no significant WTP in either group and for either benefit, with estimates close to zero and large standard errors. The sick pay asymmetry documented in Table 8 is preserved – across all subgroups, pushed workers' WTP for sick pay tends to fall below their WTP for paid holiday, and the gap for sick pay is less precisely estimated. For workers with accident experience, the two approaches also provide near-identical estimates (pushed workers' WTP for sick pay 1.4% and 1.3%, respectively; for holiday pay 5.6% and 5.1%), and both approaches find WTP for sick pay statistically indistinguishable from zero. The one exception is Poland, where the separate model for pushed workers has a small sample (N=45) and, in consequence, produces unstable estimates. This underscores why the pooled interaction specification is preferred for country-level subgroups with small number of observations of pushed workers.

As a second robustness check, we examine whether the results are sensitive to the threshold used in the pushed/pulled classification. In the main specification, a worker is classified as pushed if the number of pushed factors exceeds the number of (weighted) pulled factors. Here, we adopt a broader definition that also treats workers with exactly equal push and pull factor scores as pushed. This boundary change reclassifies 113 workers from pulled to pushed, increasing the share of pushed workers from 29.2% to 43.8% (Figure 5).

The logit estimated with the alternative pushed definition provides broadly convergent results (full results reported in Appendix Table A5). The same three key predictors remain statistically significant in the same direction: having experienced a work-related incident (+14.5 pp.), economic dependence on platform income (+11.4 pp.), and university education (-9.4 pp.). The main difference concerns country effects: workers in Germany continue to be

more likely to be pushed than those in Poland (+9.7 pp., $p = 0.031$), but those in Italy are no longer different at conventional levels ($p = 0.072$). The overall model fit is unchanged (pseudo- $R^2 = 0.082$ vs. 0.084).

Figure 5. Pushed Workers by Country: Original vs. Alternative Definition



Note: Original definition: push factors outweigh pull factors. Alternative definition: the number of push factors is equal to or higher than the number of pull factors.

Source: Own calculations based on PWPS.

Appendix Table A6 reports WTP estimates from the interaction model under the broader definition of pushed workers. The results are consistent with the baseline specification. Across the full pooled sample, pushed workers' WTP for sick pay is 2.5% and for paid holiday 3.3%, against 0.5% and 1.2% for pulled workers; both Wald tests remain statistically significant. The estimated WTP values are modestly lower than those in Table 7 (2.8% and 3.8% for pushed). At the country level, Italy again produces the most pronounced pushed–pulled gap, with pushed workers' WTP for sick pay of 4.2% (versus 0.7% for pulled) replicating the Table 7 finding almost exactly. The holiday gap in Italy is lower (6.2% vs. 7.0% in the main specification) and the Wald test no longer approaches significance ($p = 0.142$ vs. $p = 0.062$). Germany continues to show no significant WTP in either group and no significant pushed–pulled difference. For Poland, where the broader definition noticeably increases the pushed subsample (from 45 to 84 workers), the estimates gain precision: pushed workers' WTP for sick pay is 3.6% (main: 4.7%) and for paid holiday 4.2% (main: 3.7%), with both Wald tests now statistically significant (sick pay $p = 0.007$, holiday $p = 0.010$ versus $p = 0.003$ and $p = 0.173$ in the main specification).

The vulnerable subgroup results likewise largely confirm the Table 8 findings. Among workers without a university degree, the number of pushed workers substantially increases under the broader definition (from 144 to 210 workers), improving precision for the sick pay gap: the Wald test gains statistical significance ($p = 0.009$ versus $p = 0.096$ in the main specification), while pushed WTP for sick pay rises modestly to 2.9% (main: 2.7%). The holiday gap, however, is lower (3.6% versus 4.5%) and the Wald test is no longer significant ($p = 0.257$ versus $p = 0.056$).

Among workers economically dependent on platform income, the broader definition reveals a statistically significant pushed–pulled gap in paid holiday WTP that was absent in the main model (Wald $p = 0.042$ versus $p = 0.258$), with the point estimate rising from 2.8% to 3.2% for pushed workers; the sick pay gap remains significant in both specifications. For workers with experience of platform work accident or violence, the broader definition introduces a newly significant pushed–pulled difference in sick pay (Wald $p = 0.015$ versus $p = 0.456$).

Among non-vulnerable groups, university-educated workers show a pushed–pulled sick pay gap that remains large and statistically significant under the broader definition (2.2% versus 0.5%, Wald $p = 0.002$), while the holiday gap, essentially unchanged at 3.2%, achieves stronger significance (Wald $p = 0.013$ versus $p = 0.050$). Among workers without an experience of platform work accident or violence incident, the holiday gap similarly gains statistical significance (Wald $p = 0.016$ versus $p = 0.054$ in the main model), while the sick pay gap remains large and significant throughout. The main discrepancy relative to Table 8 concerns non-dependent workers: while pushed WTP for sick pay (2.3%) is essentially unchanged, the holiday gap is lower (3.3% versus 4.5%) and the Wald test no longer reaches significance ($p = 0.111$ versus $p = 0.005$). Regarding access to job amenities, the pattern from main specification also holds: it is access to a given benefit that sharpens the distinction between pushed and pulled workers. By contrast, among workers who lack access to the respective benefit, the pushed/pulled distinction largely disappears: both groups record positive WTP estimates.

Taken together, the results confirm that the main findings are robust to the threshold choice, with the broader definition producing slightly lower WTP magnitudes alongside improved precision in subgroups – particularly Poland and dependent workers – where the increase in pushed-group size is most consequential.

5. Conclusions

This paper examines the preferences for social protection among platform workers in three European countries (Germany, Italy, and Poland) using a discrete-choice survey experiment and willingness-to-pay estimates. Respondents were presented with repeated choices between platform job alternatives differing in the provision of sick pay, paid holiday, and an associated earnings loss, allowing us to estimate the earnings share that workers are willing to forgo in exchange for each benefit. A key contribution is the distinction between workers who entered platform employment primarily because of its pull attributes – flexibility, autonomy, supplementary income – and those who did so under economic pressure or in the absence of better alternatives. We refer to these groups as pulled and pushed workers, respectively, and estimate their willingness to pay separately for each using a mixed logit framework that accommodates heterogeneity in preferences.

The findings reveal a consistent and substantial differences between the two groups. Pushed workers express sizeable and statistically significant willingness to pay for both sick pay and paid holiday across nearly all subgroups examined, and this pattern holds regardless of education level, or economic dependence on platform income. Pulled workers, by contrast, show little or no willingness to accept earnings reductions for formal social protection, particularly for sick pay; their preferences for paid holiday are somewhat more positive but remain modest by comparison.

The interaction between motivation and current access to benefits provides another analytical dimension. Among workers who already hold some form of sick pay or paid leave coverage, the gap between pushed and pulled workers is large and statistically significant – pushed workers with existing access place the highest valuations on formalising that protection, while pulled workers in the same situation show near-zero willingness to pay. Among workers who currently lack access to either benefit, the pushed/pulled distinction largely disappears: both groups express positive demand for protections they do not have, and the difference between them is statistically indistinguishable from zero. One interpretation of this pattern is that existing access shapes workers' understanding of what social protection means in practice. Those who have already experienced sick pay or paid holiday – likely through prior or concurrent employment in standard jobs – have a reference point against which the absence of these benefits in platform work becomes striking. For pushed workers, who depend on platform income and cannot easily substitute it, this awareness translates into strong demand for formalisation. They know what standard employment looks like and want to secure it. For pulled workers in the same position, existing access may simply reflect the breadth of their labour market options, and platform work remains one arrangement among several, with the result that formalising its terms carries less urgency.

Our results show that the boundary between pushed and pulled workers does not coincide with formal employment categories: both groups are distributed across employee, self-employed, and non-standard contracts, and contractual form is not a significant predictor of push motivation. This means that the emerging regulatory frameworks, including the EU Platform Work Directive, will reach pushed and pulled workers alike. Pushed workers currently on self-employed or non-standard contracts stand to gain most – obtaining access to sick pay and paid leave that they genuinely value and are willing to forgo earnings to secure. Pulled workers reclassified into employment, by contrast, face a mismatch between their preferences and the obligations of employee status. A substantial share of this group appears to have chosen platform work because it offers flexibility without the obligations attached to dependent employment. The low barriers to entry that facilitate this choice are, for them, a feature rather than a failing of the institutional arrangement. Mandatory formalisation could therefore induce exit or evasion among these workers who have deliberately selected into unregulated arrangements.

The policy that fails to account for this heterogeneity within the platform workforce may achieve less than projected in terms of coverage while generating compliance costs and displacement effects that fall disproportionately on those who were never its primary target. More targeted approaches—whether through differentiated opt-in mechanisms, income-threshold-based eligibility criteria, or targeted instruments specifically directed at workers in economically precarious positions—may better align regulatory design with the actual structure of preferences revealed by our study.

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Appendix

Figure A1. Example Choice Card presented to respondents

	Job Offer A	Job Offer B	No change
Holiday Pay	Yes	No	No
Sick Pay	No	Yes	No
Change in Earnings	-3%	-9%	0%

? Choose one of the following answers

☐ Offer A

☐ Offer B

☐ No change

Source: Own elaboration

Table A1. Share of respondents choosing each alternative, by choice set (CS) and sample source (%)

CS	Norstat			Facebook		
	Alternative I	Alternative II	Status Quo	Alternative I	Alternative II	Status Quo
1	41.7	20.8	37.5	50.7	17.8	31.5
2	37.5	29.2	33.3	43.8	23.3	32.9
3	50.0	27.1	22.9	60.4	9.6	30.1
4	20.8	45.8	33.3	13.7	42.5	43.8
5	22.9	37.5	39.6	19.2	30.1	50.7
6	29.6	42.6	27.8	36.1	35.1	28.9
7	33.3	35.2	31.5	20.6	41.2	28.9
8	25.9	42.6	27.8	20.6	41.2	38.1
9	33.3	35.2	31.5	35.1	33.0	32.0
10	25.9	37.0	37.0	23.7	43.3	33.0

Source: own elaboration based on PWPS.

Table A2. Profile of platform workers across selected survey samples (in %)

	Poland – PPWS (Kowalik et al., 2025)	Germany (Beckmann et al., 2024; Piasna et al., 2022;)	Italy – INAPP-PLUS (Cirillo et al., 2023)
Gender			
Man	90	64	54
Woman	10	36	46
Education			
Low	10	9	37
Middle	62	42	47
High	28	47	16
Age groups			
18-29	55	19	45
30-49	38	57	45
50-60+	7	24	10
Platform work type			
Delivery courier	50	-	22
Taxi-hailing	50	-	26
Cleaning	-	-	24
Other	-	-	28
Migrant Status			
Yes	36	36	2
No	64	64	98

Note: Data on the gender, age, and education of German platform workers are drawn from Beckmann et al. (2024), while information on the share of migrant workers comes from the ETUI Internet and Platform Work Survey (Piasna et al., 2022). Source: own elaboration based on Kowalik et al., 2025; Beckmann et al., 2024; Piasna et al., 2022; Cirillo et al., 2023.

Table A3. Reasons behind starting platform work by country (in %)

	Flexibility	Preference	Extra money	Easy recruitment	Lack of opportunities	Loss of income
Germany	51.2	36.0	21.7	21.3	26.7	29.5
Italy	44.9	26.5	24.3	16.5	34.6	15.1
Poland	59.1	39.7	40.9	32.8	28.7	13.8
Total	51.5	33.8	28.7	23.3	30.1	19.4

Note: The table shows the share of respondents in each country who reported a given reason for starting platform work. For instance, 51.2% of respondents in Germany declared flexibility as one of their reasons for taking up platform work. Respondents could select multiple reasons, so percentages within each country do not add up to 100%. Source: Own calculations based on PWPS.

Table A4. Willingness to pay for sick pay and paid holiday: separate models for pushed and pulled workers
(% of income; income-random mixed logit, separate subgroup estimation; 95% CI in parentheses)

	N	WTP: Sick pay	WTP: Paid holiday			Share of workers with WTP for sick pay above (%)	Share of workers with WTP for paid holiday above (%)		
Group	N	Mean (95 CI)	SD (SE)	> 0	> 9th decile (7.9%)	> 0	> 9th decile (7.9%)	> 0	>90th (12.3)
Full population									
All	777	0.86** (0.14; 1.59)	5.52 (0.90)	2.08*** (1.14; 3.01)	7.96 (1.18)	56.2	10.0	60.3	10.0
Pushed	227	3.40*** (0.98; 5.82)	9.81 (3.33)	4.97*** (2.10; 7.85)	12.04 (4.30)	63.5	32.2	66.0	27.2
Pulled	550	0.25 (-0.46; 0.97)	4.61 (0.89)	1.32*** (0.40; 2.23)	7.06 (1.12)	52.2	4.8	57.4	6.0
Germany									
All	258	0.10 (-0.86; 1.05)	3.04 (1.17)	0.78 (-0.36; 1.91)	4.98 (1.17)	51.3	0.5	56.2	1.1
Pushed	90	0.21 (-1.95; 2.37)	4.98 (2.47)	1.56 (-0.67; 3.78)	4.21 (2.78)	51.7	6.0	64.5	0.5
Pulled	168	0.27 (-0.74; 1.28)	1.94 (1.56)	0.45 (-0.86; 1.77)	5.20 (1.28)	55.5	0.0	53.5	1.2
Italy									
All	272	1.56* (-0.16; 3.29)	7.94 (2.28)	4.65*** (1.98; 7.31)	14.40 (4.26)	57.8	21.1	62.6	29.8
Pushed	92	5.50*** (1.45; 9.55)	10.65 (5.03)	7.65*** (2.44; 12.85)	13.86 (6.74)	69.7	40.9	70.9	36.9
Pulled	180	0.26 (-1.77; 2.29)	7.53 (2.60)	3.21** (0.29; 6.13)	13.96 (4.89)	51.4	15.4	59.1	25.8
Poland									
All	247	1.28* (-0.05; 2.62)	6.65 (1.68)	1.69** (0.26; 3.11)	7.43 (1.85)	57.7	15.9	59.0	7.7
Pushed	45	14.76 (-11.29; 40.81)	46.48 (76.73)	12.20 (-7.81; 32.21)	41.60 (59.80)	62.5	55.8	61.5	49.9
Pulled	202	0.45 (-0.61; 1.51)	4.89 (1.24)	1.16** (0.03; 2.28)	5.43 (1.35)	53.6	6.3	58.4	2.0
No university degree (ISCED 0-4)									
All	423	1.31** (0.05; 2.58)	7.16 (1.81)	2.78*** (1.11; 4.45)	10.78 (2.66)	57.3	17.7	60.2	18.9
Pushed	144	3.53* (-0.38; 7.43)	11.60 (5.98)	6.59** (1.54; 11.65)	16.08 (9.31)	62.0	35.2	65.9	36.2
Pulled	279	0.70 (-0.45; 1.84)	5.30 (1.60)	1.55** (0.01; 3.09)	8.91 (2.26)	55.2	8.6	56.9	11.4
University degree (ISCED 5-8)									
All	354	0.53 (-0.34; 1.39)	4.52 (0.92)	1.57*** (0.50; 2.63)	6.25 (1.08)	54.6	5.1	59.9	4.3
Pushed	83	3.15** (0.43; 5.88)	7.18 (3.34)	3.50** (0.36; 6.63)	9.09 (3.78)	67.0	25.2	65.0	16.7
Pulled	271	0.11 (-0.82; 1.04)	4.32 (1.04)	1.18** (0.05; 2.32)	5.85 (1.15)	51.0	3.5	58.0	2.9

Platform as main income source (>50% of total income)									
All	341	1.26* (-0.20; 2.72)	8.17 (1.93)	1.78** (0.20; 3.36)	8.90 (2.08)	56.1	20.7	57.9	11.9
Pushed	120	3.46* (-0.05; 6.97)	11.02 (5.15)	3.07** (0.01; 6.13)	8.63 (4.22)	62.3	34.2	63.9	14.3
Pulled	221	0.28 (-1.33; 1.88)	7.41 (2.01)	1.20 (-0.62; 3.02)	9.07 (2.34)	51.5	15.0	55.3	11.1
Platform not main income source (≤50% of total income)									
All	436	0.66 (-0.13; 1.45)	3.94 (0.90)	2.29*** (1.12; 3.45)	7.41 (1.36)	56.7	3.2	62.1	8.9
Pushed	107	3.01* (-0.20; 6.22)	6.20 (3.91)	7.10*** (1.73; 12.46)	14.72 (7.42)	68.6	21.3	68.5	36.2
Pulled	329	0.27 (-0.48; 1.02)	3.29 (0.91)	1.43*** (0.38; 2.48)	6.23 (1.22)	53.3	1.0	59.1	4.1
Experienced accident or violence in the platform work									
All	323	0.45 (-1.42; 2.32)	8.41 (2.34)	3.28*** (0.94; 5.63)	12.62 (3.81)	52.1	18.6	60.3	23.8
Pushed	120	1.39 (-2.21; 4.99)	9.26 (3.95)	5.64** (1.09; 10.20)	11.32 (6.70)	56.0	24.0	69.1	27.9
Pulled	203	0.19 (-1.93; 2.30)	7.53 (2.76)	2.14 (-0.46; 4.75)	12.03 (4.08)	51.0	15.1	57.1	20.0
No accident or violence in the platform work									
All	454	1.06*** (0.28; 1.84)	4.76 (0.95)	1.80*** (0.79; 2.80)	6.83 (1.18)	58.8	7.4	60.4	6.2
Pushed	107	5.15*** (1.39; 8.92)	11.12 (5.57)	4.64** (0.85; 8.43)	11.64 (5.32)	67.8	40.1	65.5	25.6
Pulled	347	0.23 (-0.51; 0.97)	3.97 (0.87)	1.19** (0.23; 2.15)	6.05 (1.09)	52.4	2.6	57.8	3.4
No access to sick pay									
All	340	2.01*** (0.56; 3.46)	7.27 (1.99)	2.28*** (0.70; 3.86)	8.13 (1.99)	60.9	20.7	61.0	11.0
Pushed	118	3.20 (-1.09; 7.50)	11.50 (8.03)	4.35* (-0.39; 9.09)	12.93 (9.85)	61.0	34.0	63.2	27.0
Pulled	222	1.69** (0.24; 3.14)	6.18 (1.74)	1.71** (0.09; 3.33)	7.41 (1.65)	60.8	15.6	59.1	7.7
Has access to sick pay									
All	437	0.18 (-0.67; 1.03)	4.78 (0.99)	1.93*** (0.78; 3.09)	7.85 (1.43)	51.5	5.2	59.7	9.4
Pushed	109	3.76** (0.88; 6.65)	8.60 (3.01)	5.65*** (2.09; 9.21)	11.13 (3.99)	66.9	31.4	69.4	27.6
Pulled	328	0.62 (-0.28; 1.52)	4.17 (1.08)	1.04* (-0.04; 2.11)	6.91 (1.39)	55.9	4.0	56.0	5.2

No access to paid leave									
All	317	1.55** (0.17; 2.94)	5.96 (1.67)	2.58*** (0.94; 4.22)	7.69 (1.94)	60.3	14.2	63.1	10.4
Pushed	116	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Pulled	201	1.43** (0.04; 2.83)	5.25 (1.49)	2.15** (0.48; 3.83)	6.98 (1.55)	60.8	10.7	62.1	7.3
Has access to paid leave									
All	460	0.51 (-0.33; 1.36)	5.28 (1.07)	1.81*** (0.69; 2.94)	8.00 (1.48)	53.9	8.0	59.0	9.6
Pushed	111	4.37*** (1.58; 7.16)	9.17 (3.00)	5.60*** (2.44; 8.77)	10.71 (3.46)	68.3	34.9	70.0	26.7
Pulled	349	0.37 (-0.51; 1.25)	4.44 (1.21)	0.85 (-0.21; 1.91)	7.00 (1.51)	53.3	4.4	54.8	5.1

Note: No case-level controls. Model did not converge for pushed workers without paid leave access (N = 116); estimate omitted. Reference quantiles from full-sample model: sick pay median = 0.86%, 90th = 7.94%; holiday median = 2.08%, 90th = 12.27%. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Source: Own estimations based on PWPS.

**Table A5. Determinants of Being a Pushed Platform Worker – Alternative Definition:
Average Marginal Effects from Logit Model**

Variable	Average Marginal Effects
Age (ref.: 18–24)	
25–29	-0.056 (0.071)
30–34	0.068 (0.066)
35–39	0.119* (0.067)
40–44	0.034 (0.070)
45–49	0.083 (0.073)
50–54	0.122 (0.076)
55–59	0.217*** (0.082)
60 or older	0.008 (0.087)
Female	0.028 (0.036)
University education	-0.094*** (0.035)
Migrant	-0.033 (0.056)
Country (ref.: Poland)	
Germany	0.097** (0.045)
Italy	0.079* (0.044)
Has access to paid leave	-0.046 (0.047)
Has access to sick pay	-0.049 (0.045)
Work-related incident	0.145*** (0.038)
Platform income > 50% of total	0.114*** (0.036)
Number of observations	777

*Note: The table reports average marginal effects from the logit model. It is a robustness check in which we applied an alternative pushed definition: someone is pushed if they chose at least as many push as pull factors ($neg_pos_ratio \geq 0$). Main analysis uses $neg_pos_ratio > 0$. Reference categories: age 18–24, no university education (ISCED 0–4), Poland; all binary controls = 0. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.*

Source: Own estimations based on PWPS.

Table A6. Willingness to pay for sick pay and paid holiday – alternative pushed definition
(% of income; income-random mixed logit, no case-level controls; 95% CI)

	N	WTP: Sick pay		WTP: Paid holiday		Share of workers with WTP for sick pay above (%)		Share of workers with WTP for paid holiday above (%)	
Group	N	Mean (95 CI)	SD (SE)	> 0	> 9th decile (7.9%)	> 0	> 9th decile (7.9%)	> 0	>90th (12.3)
Full population									
All	777	0.86** (0.14; 1.59)	5.52 (0.90)	2.08*** (1.14; 3.01)	7.96 (1.18)	56.2	10.0	60.3	10.0
Pushed	340	2.54*** (1.33; 3.75)	7.29 (1.35)	3.32*** (1.93; 4.71)	9.55 (1.60)	63.6	22.9	63.6	17.4
Pulled	437	0.47 (-0.50; 1.45)	5.52 (0.92)	1.22** (0.05; 2.39)	7.51 (1.05)	53.4	8.8	56.4	7.1
Wald test		$\chi^2=18.47^{***}$ ($p=0.000$)		$\chi^2=6.78^{***}$ ($p=0.009$)					
Germany									
All	258	0.10 (-0.86; 1.05)	3.04 (1.17)	0.78 (-0.36; 1.91)	4.98 (1.17)	51.3	0.5	56.2	1.1
Pushed	130	0.92 (-0.49; 2.32)	3.42 (1.29)	0.97 (-0.48; 2.41)	5.18 (1.27)	60.6	2.0	57.4	1.5
Pulled	128	0.83 (-0.57; 2.22)	3.36 (1.42)	0.62 (-1.13; 2.36)	5.04 (1.19)	59.7	1.7	54.9	1.0
Wald test		$\chi^2=3.62^*$ ($p=0.057$)		$\chi^2=0.10$ ($p=0.753$)					
Italy									
All	272	1.56* (-0.16; 3.29)	7.94 (2.28)	4.65*** (1.98; 7.31)	14.40 (4.26)	57.8	21.1	62.6	29.8
Pushed	126	4.22*** (1.45; 6.99)	11.75 (4.09)	6.23*** (2.65; 9.82)	17.16 (5.65)	64.0	37.6	64.2	36.2
Pulled	146	0.66 (-1.62; 2.94)	7.11 (2.06)	3.48** (0.44; 6.53)	12.64 (3.73)	53.7	15.3	60.9	24.3
Wald test		$\chi^2=9.52^{***}$ ($p=0.002$)		$\chi^2=2.16$ ($p=0.142$)					
Poland									
All	247	1.28* (-0.05; 2.62)	6.65 (1.68)	1.69** (0.26; 3.11)	7.43 (1.85)	57.7	15.9	59.0	7.7
Pushed	84	3.57*** (1.10; 6.03)	9.38 (2.87)	4.18*** (1.39; 6.98)	10.53 (3.22)	64.8	32.1	65.4	22.1
Pulled	163	0.12 (-1.47; 1.71)	6.56 (1.59)	0.48 (-1.17; 2.13)	7.07 (1.61)	50.7	11.7	52.7	4.8
Wald test		$\chi^2=7.38^{***}$ ($p=0.007$)		$\chi^2=6.71^{***}$ ($p=0.010$)					

No university degree (ISCED 0–4)									
All	423	1.31** (0.05; 2.58)	7.16 (1.81)	2.78*** (1.11; 4.45)	10.78 (2.66)	57.3	17.7	60.2	18.9
Pushed	210	2.87*** (0.94; 4.81)	9.46 (2.79)	3.62*** (1.43; 5.81)	12.20 (3.31)	61.9	29.6	61.7	23.9
Pulled	213	0.29 (-1.47; 2.04)	6.61 (1.67)	2.04* (-0.18; 4.26)	9.94 (2.47)	51.7	12.3	58.1	15.2
Wald test		$\chi^2=6.82^{***}$ ($p=0.009$)		$\chi^2=1.28$ ($p=0.257$)					
University degree (ISCED 5–8)									
All	354	0.53 (-0.34; 1.39)	4.52 (0.92)	1.57*** (0.50; 2.63)	6.25 (1.08)	54.6	5.1	59.9	4.3
Pushed	130	2.21*** (0.66; 3.75)	5.71 (1.28)	3.15*** (1.34; 4.96)	7.67 (1.53)	65.0	15.8	65.9	11.7
Pulled	224	0.47 (-0.63; 1.56)	4.66 (0.95)	0.74 (-0.52; 2.00)	6.07 (0.98)	54.0	5.5	54.8	2.9
Wald test		$\chi^2=10.01^{***}$ ($p=0.002$)		$\chi^2=6.14^{**}$ ($p=0.013$)					
Platform as main income source (>50)									
All	341	1.26* (-0.20; 2.72)	8.17 (1.93)	1.78** (0.20; 3.36)	8.90 (2.08)	56.1	20.7	57.9	11.9
Pushed	180	2.55** (0.41; 4.69)	9.72 (2.64)	3.21*** (1.04; 5.38)	10.79 (2.87)	60.3	29.0	61.7	20.0
Pulled	161	0.16 (-1.82; 2.13)	7.90 (1.72)	0.26 (-1.97; 2.49)	8.10 (1.68)	50.8	16.2	51.3	6.9
Wald test		$\chi^2=3.99^{**}$ ($p=0.046$)		$\chi^2=4.15^{**}$ ($p=0.042$)					
Platform not main income source (≤50)									
All	436	0.66 (-0.13; 1.45)	3.94 (0.90)	2.29*** (1.12; 3.45)	7.41 (1.36)	56.7	3.2	62.1	8.9
Pushed	160	2.34*** (0.96; 3.71)	5.53 (1.36)	3.33*** (1.52; 5.13)	8.64 (1.81)	66.4	15.5	65.0	15.0
Pulled	276	0.36 (-0.69; 1.41)	3.91 (0.97)	1.78*** (0.43; 3.14)	7.21 (1.28)	53.6	2.6	59.8	7.3
Wald test		$\chi^2=11.96^{***}$ ($p=0.001$)		$\chi^2=2.54$ ($p=0.111$)					
Experienced accident or violence in the platform work									
All	323	0.45 (-1.42; 2.32)	8.41 (2.34)	3.28*** (0.94; 5.63)	12.62 (3.81)	52.1	18.6	60.3	23.8
Pushed	180	2.39* (-0.19; 4.96)	10.36 (3.35)	4.12*** (1.18; 7.07)	14.16 (4.63)	59.1	29.6	61.5	28.3
Pulled	143	2.05 (-0.92; 5.01)	9.89 (3.58)	2.49 (-0.79; 5.76)	11.49 (3.67)	58.2	27.5	58.6	19.7
Wald test		$\chi^2=5.89^{**}$ ($p=0.015$)		$\chi^2=0.67$ ($p=0.412$)					
No accident or violence in the platform work									
All	454	1.06*** (0.28; 1.84)	4.76 (0.95)	1.80*** (0.79; 2.80)	6.83 (1.18)	58.8	7.4	60.4	6.2
Pushed	160	2.68*** (1.28; 4.09)	6.24 (1.40)	3.18*** (1.55; 4.81)	8.12 (1.60)	66.6	20.0	65.2	13.1
Pulled	294	0.16 (-0.76; 1.08)	4.46 (0.89)	1.05* (-0.11; 2.22)	6.48 (1.07)	51.4	4.0	56.5	4.2
Wald test		$\chi^2=11.36^{***}$ ($p=0.001$)		$\chi^2=5.75^{**}$ ($p=0.016$)					

No access to sick pay									
All	340	2.01*** (0.56; 3.46)	7.27 (1.99)	2.28*** (0.70; 3.86)	8.13 (1.99)	60.9	20.7	61.0	11.0
Pushed	175	2.62*** (0.66; 4.59)	8.16 (2.43)	2.82*** (0.75; 4.89)	8.91 (2.42)	62.6	25.7	62.4	14.4
Pulled	165	1.41 (-0.46; 3.28)	6.70 (1.86)	1.78* (-0.33; 3.89)	7.62 (1.92)	58.3	16.5	59.2	8.4
Wald test		$\chi^2=0.95$ ($p=0.331$)		$\chi^2=0.59$ ($p=0.441$)					
Has access to sick pay									
All	437	0.18 (-0.67; 1.03)	4.78 (0.99)	1.93*** (0.78; 3.09)	7.85 (1.43)	51.5	5.2	59.7	9.4
Pushed	165	2.40*** (0.88; 3.92)	6.45 (1.51)	3.72*** (1.82; 5.61)	9.87 (2.09)	64.5	19.5	64.7	19.3
Pulled	272	1.26** (0.07; 2.45)	5.34 (1.23)	0.93 (-0.46; 2.31)	7.54 (1.29)	59.3	10.5	54.9	6.6
Wald test		$\chi^2=18.72***$ ($p=0.000$)		$\chi^2=7.37***$ ($p=0.007$)					
No access to paid leave									
All	317	1.55** (0.17; 2.94)	5.96 (1.67)	2.58*** (0.94; 4.22)	7.69 (1.94)	60.3	14.2	63.1	10.4
Pushed	167	2.60*** (0.69; 4.52)	7.30 (2.20)	2.90*** (0.84; 4.97)	8.18 (2.28)	63.9	23.2	63.9	12.6
Pulled	150	0.38 (-1.49; 2.25)	5.23 (1.45)	2.39** (0.18; 4.59)	7.50 (2.05)	52.9	7.4	62.5	9.4
Wald test		$\chi^2=3.19*$ ($p=0.074$)		$\chi^2=0.15$ ($p=0.702$)					
Has access to paid leave									
All	460	0.51 (-0.33; 1.36)	5.28 (1.07)	1.81*** (0.69; 2.94)	8.00 (1.48)	53.9	8.0	59.0	9.6
Pushed	173	2.43*** (0.91; 3.95)	6.92 (1.60)	3.69*** (1.82; 5.56)	10.06 (2.16)	63.7	21.3	64.3	19.7
Pulled	287	0.70 (-0.42; 1.82)	5.43 (1.18)	0.70 (-0.63; 2.03)	7.53 (1.29)	55.1	9.1	53.7	6.2
Wald test		$\chi^2=13.40***$ ($p=0.000$)		$\chi^2=8.69***$ ($p=0.003$)					

Note: No case-level controls. Reference q90 from a full-sample income-random mixed logit without interaction terms, used as fixed thresholds across all specifications. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$. The table reports the results from a robustness check in which we applied an alternative pushed definition: someone is pushed if they chose at least as many push as pull factors ($neg_pos_ratio \geq 0$). Main analysis uses $neg_pos_ratio > 0$.

Source: Own estimations based on PWPS.

Table A7. Comparison of estimates of WTP between models with and without control variables
 (% of income; income-random mixed logit, full sample)

	With Control Variables	Without Control Variables
<i>Sick pay</i>		
WTP mean	0.92%	0.86%
SD of WTP	6.36	5.52
90th percentile (q90)	9.07%	7.94%
<i>Paid holiday</i>		
WTP mean	2.42%	2.08%
SD of WTP	9.29	7.96
90th percentile (q90)	14.33%	12.27%
N (respondents)	777	777

Note: Both models use cmxtmixlogit with three random parameters (sick pay, paid holiday, income loss). The model with control variables includes age group, gender, university education, migrant status, country, access to sick pay, access to paid leave, work-related incident, platform as main income source.

Source: Own estimations based on PWPS.



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