Working paper – Deliverable 3.2

How context shapes care-based discrimination in hiring: evidence from a cross-national factorial survey experiment

Authors: Dominik Buttler, Vegar Bjørnshagen, Marta Palczyńska, Iga Magda, Katarzyna Lipowska, Ona Valls, Rosa Maria Radogna

June 2025

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No Project 101094626. *Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. The European Union cannot be held responsible for them. The deliverable is under review by the European Commission*.

PATHS2INCLUDE

PATHS 2 INCLUDE

European Labour Markets Under Pressure – New knowledge on pathways to include persons in vulnerable situations

Title: How context shapes care-based discrimination in hiring: evidence from a cross-national factorial survey experiment

Date: June 2025

Responsible organisation: OsloMet

Author(s): Dominik Buttler, Vegar Bjørnshagen, Marta Palczyńska, Iga Magda, Katarzyna Lipowska, Ona Valls, Rosa Maria Radogna

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.15720906.

Acknowledgements:

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No Project 101094626.

Contents

1. Introduction 4

2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 6

Recruitment and Screening Practices 7

Work Arrangements 8

Diversity Policies and Practices 8

3. Data and Methods 9

3.1. Vignettes and Experimental Design 9

3.2. Survey Data 12

3.3. Survey Organisation and Sample Selection 12

3.4. Study context 13

3.5. Descriptive Statistics 14

4. Empirical Strategy 15

5. Results 17

5.1. Caregiving Responsibility Discrimination by Country 17

5.2. Organisational Features as Moderators of Care Discrimination 19

5.3. Gender-Specific Analysis 22

6. Robustness analysis 25

7. Conclusions 26

Appendix. Supplementary tables and figures 28

References 37

1. Introduction

Care responsibilities shape gendered inequality in the labour market, as evidenced by the divergence in the career trajectories and wages of men and women after parenthood (Charles, 2011; Goldin, 2021). It is well established that women face wage penalties due to having children, while men are largely unaffected or may even experience a premium (Budig and England, 2001; Kleven et al., 2019). Discrimination by employers has been suggested as one possible factor behind the motherhood penalties (Blau & Kahn, 2017). By discrimination, we refer to situations where individuals with comparable observable indicators of productivity are treated differently based on their parental status. This differential treatment may occur in hiring, remuneration, promotion, or dismissals.

Experimental research provides compelling evidence of hiring discrimination based on parenthood, but the effects differ by gender and region. A recent systematic review of field and lab experimental studies find a motherhood penalty in hiring in the majority of studies (El Haj et al., 2024) although a meta-analysis of correspondence studies suggests that this penalty is relatively small (Lippens et al., 2023). Evidence of hiring discrimination against mothers has predominantly been found in the US (e.g., Correll et al., 2007; Ishizuka, 2021), whereas findings from Europe are mixed (Becker et al., 2019; Bygren et al., 2017; Hipp, 2020; Oesch et al., 2017; Zamberlan et al., 2024). For men, most European studies report no effect of parenthood on hiring chances (e.g., Bygren et al., 2017; Hipp, 2020), but some US studies identify a fatherhood premium (e.g., Correll et al., 2007; Henle et al., 2020).

The theory of statistical discrimination (Arrow, 1973) suggests that parenthood discrimination may arise from imperfect information in employers' decision-making, where candidates' productivity is inferred based on characteristics of the group they belong to (El Haj et al., 2024). For instance, if employers know that women, on average, face greater constraints due to caregiving compared to men, they may use this group-level information when assessing individual jobseekers. However, studies also demonstrate that employers have biased assumptions about mothers' job commitment, effort and competency (e.g., Correll et al., 2007; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2004). Whether biased or not, the extent to which these beliefs become decisive in employers' decision-making may depend on the context of employment, including organizational characteristics and job demands.

While previous experimental studies of parenthood discrimination have focussed primarily on individual-level mechanisms, less research has examined how different employment contexts may increase or mitigate such discrimination. A notable exception is Ishizuka (2021), who found stronger discrimination against mothers in the US when job demands were in greater conflict with stereotypes about motherhood, including time pressure, collaboration, travel and schedule instability. Thus, employers' bias against caregivers may vary with job demands determining the "greediness of work" (Goldin, 2023) that makes it more or less difficult to balance a job and family demands. Moreover, a substantial body of sociological literature highlights that employers operate in organizational contexts that can either constrain or facilitate the extent to which stereotypes translate into discriminatory behaviour (Baron and Bielby, 1980; Reskin, 2003). Even though organizations have increasingly implemented policies and practices to ensure equal treatment, increase diversity, and ease work-life conflicts (e.g., flexible scheduling; Dobbin and Kalev, 2022; OECD, 2020), studies that link discriminatory outcomes based on parental status to such measures remain limited.

This study addresses this gap by examining the organizational determinants of hiring discrimination based on care responsibilities using data from a harmonized cross-national factorial survey experiment carried out in Germany, Norway, Poland, and Romania. In the factorial survey, fictional job candidates were presented to individuals with recruitment experience, who were then asked to indicate the probability that the candidates would be hired at the organization they recruit for. By randomly varying a set of dimensions, including gender, partnership status, and having children, we can identify whether, and how, parenthood affects employers' hiring propensities towards different types of candidates. The survey also includes a range of questions about organizational features and job demands such as recruitment and screening practices, work arrangements, and diversity policies.

The study extends the literature on parenthood discrimination in at least two directions. First, we investigate whether various aspects of the organizational context –such as recruitment and screening practices, work arrangements, and diversity policies– moderate the extent of parenthood discrimination. This knowledge is crucial for our understanding of how organizations can mitigate or amplify parenthood penalties in hiring processes, and whether discrimination based on parenthood is widespread or limited to certain workplace contexts.

Second, by explicitly distinguishing between single-parent and two-parent households, the study provides new insights into hiring discrimination on the basis of parenthood in relation to partnership status. Previous experimental research has focused primarily on parental status, while its interaction with partnership status has not been addressed in a complete or unified way (El Haj et al., 2024). For instance, in some studies, all applicants signal the same partnership status (e.g., Correll et al., 2007; Hipp, 2020), whereas other studies ostensibly do not mention the applicants' partnership status at all (e.g., Zamberlan et al., 2024; Ishizuka, 2021).[1] Notably, single parenthood, where one parent bears the childcare responsibility and work-life conflicts alone, has received limited attention. By comparing discrimination against parents from single versus two-parent households, this study highlights care responsibilities as a likely mechanism and, accordingly, refers to the phenomenon as discrimination based on care responsibilities throughout the remainder of the paper.

We find evidence of discrimination based on parenthood and partnership status, especially for (single) mothers. The results further show that discrimination based on care responsibilities is moderated by three categories of organizational characteristics and job demands. First, in organizations that have implemented diversity policy measures, there is less discrimination based on care responsibilities against mothers. Second, discrimination based on care responsibilities is also less likely to occur in organizations that offer flexible work arrangements, which particularly benefits single mothers. Third, female candidates with a child have poorer hiring prospects for 'greedy jobs', regardless of whether they are in a relationship. In sum, the findings highlight efforts to reduce discrimination based on care responsibilities must take into account how work is organized and how and which diversity initiatives are implemented.

[1] Yet another strategy has been to partially manipulate partnership status, for example, by comparing married applicants with children to single applicants without children (e.g., Albert et al., 2011; Fuegen et al., 2004). In such cases, it is difficult to determine whether observed effects can be attributed to partnership status rather than parenthood (cf. El Haj et al., 2024).

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the preregistered hypotheses[2], the theory and prior work from which they are derived. In Section 3, we describe our data, the factorial survey experiment and the survey context. Finally, we present descriptive statistics. In Section 4 we present our empirical strategy. Then, we present our results and robustness checks in Sections 5 and 6 and conclude by discussing the implications of the findings in Section 7.

2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

Most theories of hiring discrimination focus on employers' motives to discriminate grounded in individual motivations or psychological biases (Quillian and Midtbøen, 2021). Two dominant explanations for discrimination are statistical and taste-based discrimination. Statistical discrimination suggests that when employers lack full information about a candidate's productivity, they rely on group-based stereotypes to make hiring decisions (Arrow, 1973; Galos & Coppock, 2023). For instance, care responsibilities may be perceived as incompatible with productivity or commitment, particularly under the ideal worker norm, which assumes that the most dedicated employees prioritize work over family obligations (Birkelund et al., 2022). Similarly, role congruity theory (del Carmen Triana et al., 2023) suggests that women, due to societal expectations around caregiving, may be viewed as less suited for leadership or high-intensity roles. Unlike statistical discrimination, taste-based discrimination is driven by explicit biases or preferences against certain groups (Becker, 1957), which can be reinforced by employers, co-workers, or customers.

Beyond employers' motives or dispositions that influence discriminatory decision-making, organizational theories direct attention to the broader structural context in which hiring decisions take place, emphasizing that discrimination is not solely an individual-level phenomenon (Pager and Shepherd, 2008). Scholars have long argued that organizational structures may constrain or enable discriminatory behaviour thus defining employers' opportunity structure for discrimination (Petersen and Saporta, 2004; Reskin, 2000). In addition, organizational arrangements may also condition the effect of individual-level factors behind discrimination such as cognitive bias and stereotypes (Fibbi et al., 2021), for example by amplifying or minimizing the impact of employers' concerns related to hiring individuals with childcare responsibilities. In this section, we develop hypotheses about organizational moderators of discrimination based on care responsibilities, focussing on recruitment and screening practices, work arrangements, and diversity policies.

[2] We have preregistered each of the hypotheses tested in the article. In the preregistration, we specified 31 hypotheses. However, the focus of this article is on the 7 hypotheses that concern organizational moderators of discrimination based on care responsibilities. The remaining hypotheses are tested in separate papers.

Recruitment and Screening Practices

Based on existing theoretical and empirical work, we expect that organizations' recruitment and screening practices will influence the extent of discrimination based on care responsibilities (Holzer and Neumark, 2000; Reskin, 2000). First, statistical discrimination theory posits that discrimination in hiring is contingent on the information employers have when evaluating candidates. The theory suggests that employers resort to group-based assumptions, for instance about mothers or fathers, to make inferences about specific candidates when faced with limited information about applicants' productivity (Guryan & Charles, 2013; Thijssen, Coenders, & Lancee, 2021). Conversely, when employers have more information about candidates' productivity, they will be less likely to discriminate. Thus, when organizations screen applicants using multiple sources of information—such as structured assessments, work samples, or detailed applicant histories—biases are less likely to influence hiring decisions, as employers can directly assess individual productivity rather than relying on assumptions about group characteristics (Autor & Scarborough, 2008).

Hypothesis 1: Discrimination based on care responsibilities is less likely in organizations that use multiple sources of information (signals) about applicants.

Next, the structure of the hiring process is likely to shape the likelihood of discrimination. Drawing on theory of group dynamics, previous studies have highlighted the potential importance of collective versus individual decision-making for gender bias in hiring (Erlandsson et al., 2023). An individual that rejects dominant beliefs about competence differences between groups may direct the group away from such cognitive biases (Ridgeway and Correll, 2006). Moreover, the presence of others may affect individual behaviour by creating a culture of peer accountability, whereby more supportive participants put normative pressure on their more resistant counterparts (Correll, 2017). Thus, when hiring decisions are made collectively in larger groups, and the individuals involved need to justify their assessments to each other, we expect that care responsibilities are less likely to serve as a basis for discrimination.

Hypothesis 2: Discrimination based on care responsibilities is less likely in organizations with well-developed recruitment panels/boards.

Previous research shows that informal hiring practices and ambiguity amplifies bias, especially when decisions are made based on discretion and without clear criteria (Correll, 2017; Midtbøen, 2015). By contrast, formalized hiring practices—such as predefined evaluation criteria and mechanisms for holding decision-makers accountable—may mitigate discrimination by decreasing the salience of group traits and limiting the influence of managerial discretion (Bielby 2000; Reskin, 2000). While some scholars have argued that bureaucratic hiring structures reinforce inequalities (Acker, 1990), research suggests that standardized procedures can reduce bias by ensuring consistent and merit-based decision-making (Midtbøen, 2015). Formalized hiring procedures also imply that more resources are devoted to recruitment and a more careful review of applications, which is likely to result in more fair evaluations of applicants. In line with this, previous experimental research shows that larger firms and public sector employers, which tend to rely on formalized HR practices, often exhibit lower levels of discrimination compared to small and private-sector organizations, presumably with more informal hiring procedures and greater scope for discretion (Quillian & Midtbøen, 2021; Banerjee, Reitz, & Oreopoulos, 2018; Bjørnshagen, 2022).

Hypothesis 3: Discrimination based on care responsibilities is less likely in organizations with more formalized recruitment processes (documented, with clear recruitment criteria, and with little individual discretion in hiring decisions).

Work arrangements

Theories of discrimination based on childcare responsibilities suggest that work conditions would lead to variation in the prevalence of such discrimination. For example, when jobs allow for flexible work arrangements, such as remote work or adjustable working hours, employers may be less likely to perceive care responsibilities as a barrier to productivity, work effort, or job commitment (Fuller & Hirsch, 2019). This is particularly relevant for mothers, who are often subject to assumptions about their availability and dedication. Empirical evidence suggests that remote work does not negatively impact mothers' wages or career progression, although it may disadvantage fathers and childless workers (Kasperska et al., 2024). Thus, in organizations that offer flexible work arrangements that ease conflicts between work and family life, employers may be less concerned about hiring individuals with care responsibilities, thus reducing the likelihood of parenthood discrimination.

Hypothesis 4: Discrimination based on care responsibilities is less likely in organizations offering flexible work arrangements (remote work opportunities, flexible working hours).

By contrast, discrimination based on care responsibilities is likely to be higher under working conditions that exacerbate work-life conflicts. The so-called greedy jobs (Goldin, 2021) which include long hours, availability on short notice, and frequent business travel, are mostly high-paying and often remain male-dominated, reinforcing exclusivity and disadvantaging individuals with care responsibilities (Cortes & Pan, 2019). On the one hand, labour and product markets operating in highly competitive environments have strong incentives to hire the most qualified candidates, regardless of caregiving status (Goldin, 2021). On the other hand, these jobs disproportionately disadvantage caregivers, who are predominantly women, as the nature of these roles is often incompatible with family obligations. Therefore, employers' bias against caregivers is likely to be greater for jobs that are in greater conflict with family responsibilities.

Hypothesis 5: Discrimination based on care responsibilities is more likely in the case of greedy jobs (requiring overtime work, business trips, work on weekends, outside standard working hours, or availability on short notice).

Diversity Policies and Practices

Finally, diversity management policies and practices should limit discrimination against individuals with care responsibilities. While some organizations adopt gender equality and diversity policies symbolically, without substantive impact (Edelman, 1992), setting goals is a first step towards workplace equality and diversity and may be indicative of an organizational culture that is supportive of non-discriminatory hiring. At the same time, previous work suggests that simply setting goals is insufficient to change organizational practices (Dobbin and Kalev, 2022; Kang et al., 2016). To achieve organizational goals, this literature indicates that organizations should also establish accountability structures through monitoring of diversity efforts, for instance by appointing diversity managers (Dobbin et al. 2015). Accountability theory posits that when decision-makers are held responsible for their hiring decisions, they are more likely to engage in fair and unbiased decision-making (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Castilla, 2015;

Bielby, 2000). Accordingly, Dobbin et al. (2015) argue that diversity managers help firms advance diversity and equal opportunity "by making hiring managers feel accountable for their decisions" (2015: 1021). Thus, in organizations that have diversity and equity policies that are subject to monitoring, we expect less discrimination based on care responsibilities.

Hypothesis 6: Discrimination based on care responsibilities is less likely in organizations with developed diversity policies that are subject to internal reporting and monitoring (e.g., diversity or equality objectives, dedicated personnel for diversity, inclusion, and equality).[3]

Besides organizational goals and efforts to monitor progress, organizations also implement various diversity measures that have been found to improve employment outcomes for women and minority workers (Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006). As indicated above, programs that assign organizational responsibility and activate social accountability, such as creating diversity committees that oversee diversity-related progress, and non-discrimination efforts, may be particularly effective (Kalev et al., 2015). Other measures that have been found to be positively associated with hiring of women and minorities include diversity management training programs, mentoring programs that are available to all employees, and targeted recruitment programs (Kalev et al., 2006; Dobbin et al., 2015, see also Holzer and Neumark, 2000). This line of research suggests that programs that engage managers are particularly effective as they increase their support for diversity and inclusion. In addition to engaging managers, such measures may help to challenge stereotypes and mitigate employers' concerns and biases that otherwise disadvantage caregivers in the hiring process.

Hypothesis 7: Discrimination based on care responsibilities is less likely in organizations that implement diversity policy measures (offering training schemes focused on diversity management, adopting specific hiring practices that account for diversity and equity, establishing formal groups to address diversity-related tasks, providing mentoring or buddy programs accessible to a wide range of employees).

3. Data and Methods

3.1. Vignettes and Experimental Design

To investigate discrimination in hiring, we conducted a factorial survey experiment (FSE) in which respondents evaluated hypothetical job candidates presented through vignettes. The FSE offers several methodological advantages. First, compared to conventional single-item survey questions, FSEs are less susceptible to (although not free from) social desirability bias—a critical benefit when examining sensitive topics such as discrimination. Second, when effectively designed, vignette dimensions are orthogonal, enhancing statistical efficiency and enabling the identification of effects that are confounded in observational data (Auspurg & Hinz, 2015, p. 25).

[3] Based on the previous research, we modified the preregistered hypothesis about diversity policies to include the following specification: "that are subject to internal reporting and monitoring." This change is consistent with how we measure the existence of diversity policies, which is based on a questions of whether the organization has any diversity- or equity-related aims *that are subject to internal reporting and monitoring* (see Section 3.2).

Third, the method allows for full control over the information provided to respondents, reducing bias from unobserved variables.

FSEs also have important limitations. The usual criticisms of this method highlight two main weaknesses. First, it captures behavioural intentions rather than actual behaviours, which may diverge. Second, the decision-making context is often purely hypothetical and disconnected from the real-world consequences of poor decisions, thereby lacking psychological realism (Forster & Neugebauer, 2024, pp. 888–889). These limitations introduce potential sources of bias, particularly due to socially desirable responding (SDR) and insufficient effort responding (IER). SDR refers to the tendency of respondents to answer questions in a manner they believe will be viewed favourably by others, often resulting in the overreporting of socially acceptable behaviours. In surveys on hiring discrimination, SDR is likely to lead to an underestimation of effects, as respondents may be reluctant to admit evaluating candidates in ways that could be perceived discriminatory. IER may reduce reliability or bias the results due to a careless approach to evaluating candidates in vignette studies. In FSEs the cost of making incorrect decisions is essentially zero. Despite these limitations, substantial empirical evidence suggests convergence in the results obtained through survey and field experiments, respectively (Hainmueller et al., 2015; Petzold & Wolbring, 2019). Although a recent study on hiring discrimination highlighted serious limitations of the FSE method (Forster & Neugebauer, 2024), it has faced criticism for methodological inconsistencies (Pickett, 2025).

In this study, we deliberately opted for the FSE methodology over correspondence tests.[4] While correspondence studies are less prone to bias when examining hiring intentions, they are not easily combined with surveys, which limits their capacity to capture organizational-level factors. Consequently, little is known about how such characteristics moderate discrimination in hiring. Our study addresses this gap by integrating experimentally manipulated candidate profiles with rich organizational-level data, offering novel insights into the contextual drivers of discriminatory hiring practices. To mitigate potential bias, we recruited respondents with hiring experience—a commonly recommended strategy for enhancing psychological realism. We also applied rigorous response filtering to analyse only data meeting quality standards, including a minimum response time to address IER. Additionally, we accounted for socially desirable responding in our robustness checks by including relevant controls. These methodological safeguards are discussed in detail later in the text.

The vignettes describing the fictitious candidates included information typically available at the early stages of hiring and were complemented by proxies for care-related discrimination, namely parenthood and partnership status. We assumed that such personal details – even if not officially collected – are often disclosed during the selection process. The list of dimensions (variables) and their levels (values) is presented in *Table 1*.[5] Our proxy for caregiving responsibilities was derived from two vignette dimensions: partnership status (Dim6) and parenthood status (Dim7).

[4] Sending fictitious job applications in response to real job o advertisements that differ only in one (or some) characteristic (e.g., gender, ethnicity) to observe differences in employer responses.

[5] The scope of the research project was broader than the focus of this analysis, which explains the inclusion of the nationality dimension—even though it will not be examined in this paper.

Table 1. Dimensions and Their Levels Used in the Vignettes

Dimensions	Levels
Dim1: referrals	1. you received the application directly from the candidate 2. the candidate was recommended by one of the employees
Dim2: gender	1. woman 2. man
Dim3: nationality	1. host country [German; Norwegian; Polish; Romanian] 2. host country[6] [German; Norwegian; Polish; Romanian] 3. Ukrainian 4. other country [Syrian (in NO and DE); Belarusian (in PL); Nepalese (in RO)]
Dim4: country where the candidate graduated	1. host country 2. home country
Dim5: level of host country language	1. proficient level (C2) 2. upper intermediate level (B2)
Dim6: partnership status	1. the candidate lives with a partner/spouse and 2. the candidate lives alone
Dim7: parenthood status	1. the candidate rises a preschool-aged child 2. the candidate has no children
Dim8: candidate's experience	1. two years in the host country in a similar position 2. two years in the host country not related to the job applied for

In addition to the randomly varied dimensions, the vignettes included fixed characteristics. Each candidate had an education level and English proficiency appropriate for the position applied for (in the respective country). Age was set as the average age for a given level of education plus two years—resulting in each candidate being either 22 or 25 years old. Furthermore, we specified that all candidates had valid residence and work permits. To eliminate the potential influence of labour market tightness, the respondents were also informed that the hypothetical job posting had received a sufficient number of applications. The respondents could choose to assess candidates applying for one of the following jobs: ICT technician, office clerk, secretary, bookkeeping clerk, sales worker. These positions were selected because they are common and found in many organizations, regardless of sector or ownership type. Given the aim of the study, we wanted to ensure access to a diverse range of organizations. A sample vignette is presented in *Figure A1* in Appendix.

All dimensions presented in *Table 1* yield 512 possible combinations. Two unlikely combinations were excluded – those involving native candidates with either low native language proficiency (Dim3 ≤ 2 & Dim5 = 2) or foreign educational credentials (Dim3 ≤ 2 & Dim4 = 2). To reduce this relatively large number of combinations a sample of vignettes was drawn with the use of SAS %Mktex macro (Auspurg & Hinz, 2015, pp. 3–32; Kuhfeld, 2010, pp. 243–265). This algorithm allows for selecting a fraction of the vignettes with relatively little loss of the key properties—orthogonality and balance. The design assumed all main effects and two-way interactions could be estimated (except for interactions concerning excluded combinations). The final sample consisted of 144 vignettes as further increases did not meaningfully improve D-efficiency (D =

[6] To approximate the actual applicant pools and to increase psychological realism, the number of native applicants was doubled. Technically, this was achieved by assigning two values to the 'nationality' level.

86.46%). These were divided into 24 decks, each containing 6 randomly ordered vignettes. Decks were randomly assigned to respondents.

Respondents were asked to evaluate the six candidates using the following response scale:

How likely is it that this person would be employed given the needs and characteristics of your organisation/ organisation you recruit for? (0 – very unlikely; 10 – very likely)

Each vignette also included a second response scale, measuring the perceived likelihood of the candidate being invited for a job interview. The responses were found to be highly correlated. Therefore, the analysis focuses on employment likelihood variable, as it has a less skewed distribution. The analyses of the second dependent variable serve as a robustness check.

3.2. Survey Data

The factorial survey experiment was embedded in a questionnaire that included questions about the respondents and the organizations they recruit for. The operationalization of the organizational features used to test the hypotheses with the references to the survey questionnaire is presented in *Table 2*.

Table 2. Summary of Hypotheses and Measurement of Key Independent Variables

Hypotheses	**Operationalisation of Variables**
H1: sources of information	Scale: number (sum) of various recruitment channels used in the recruitment process (e.g., announcements at the unemployment office, job ads on social media); Q3 [*rchuef–rchoth*]
H2: recruitment panel	Dummy: 1 – only one person involved in the recruitment process for the selected occupation within the organisation; 0 – otherwise; Q5 [*rcper1*]
H3: recruitment formalisation	Scale: mean of three 5-point Likert scale items measuring: whether the recruitment process is documented, whether recruitment criteria are clearly defined, and whether recruiters can bypass formal criteria (reverse-coded); z-standardised; Q7–Q9 [*recrdoc, recrcrit, recrdisc*]
H4: flexible working arrangements	Scale: mean of three 4-item variables measuring how easy it is, for a selected occupation, to: vary the start or end of the working day, work remotely at least two days per week, take one or two days off on short notice; z-standardised; Q13 [*posflex1– posflex3*]
H5: greedy jobs	Scale: mean of four 4-item variables measuring how often, for a selected occupation, employees: work overtime, work weekends or outside regular hours, are available on short notice outside standard hours, go on business trips; z-standardised; Q14 [*posgreed1 –posgreed4*]
H6: diversity policy (aims)	Dummy: 1 – the organisation has gender diversity goals that are monitored and reported AND employs a diversity manager; 0 – otherwise; Q19 [*divmng*], Q21 [*divact1*]
H7: diversity policy measures	Scale: number (sum) of existing diversity-oriented measures implemented in the organisation: training scheme(s) focused on diversity management, hiring practices that take account of diversity/equity, formal group(s) dealing with diversity-related tasks, mentoring or buddy programmes accessible to a wide range of employees; z-standardised; Q22 [*divmes1-divmes4*]

3.3. Survey Organisation and Sample Selection

The study was conducted in four countries simultaneously, between November 2024 and March 2025 using respondent panels from multiple providers (Cint, Dynata, Norstat, Daisycon). In Poland and Germany, a small number of additional responses were collected through alternative

contact sources. In Poland, these included recruiters who had posted job advertisements on the website of the public employment office. In Germany, contacts were obtained via email from managers and recruiters identified through the consulting firm Dun & Bradstreet and the HR managers' association BPM. Prior to conducting the study, the hypotheses, method and proposed analytic plan were preregistered in the Open Science at: https://osf.io/z3paf/?view_only=d635849ac66147a79bfea982441f0da3

The target population of respondents comprised individuals with experience in employee recruitment (e.g., managers, business owners, external recruiters, HR specialists). Two respondent screening methods were applied. First, pre-targeting within the respondent panels invited individuals aged 18 and above, currently employed in recruitment-related positions. Second, the questionnaire included three additional screening questions. Respondents were asked: (1) to identify their areas of professional activity, with eligibility limited to those selecting "Hiring of employees"; (2) to indicate occupations for which they felt competent to assess candidates, with inclusion requiring at least one positive response from a predefined list (as described above); and (3) to identify a specific organization they (used to) recruit for and whose characteristics they felt confident describing. Those unable to identify such an organization were excluded from the survey.

Data quality was managed across four dimensions: IP validation, browser characteristics, response durations, and grid answer patterns. These checks identified fraudulent or low-effort responses based on mismatches in location or device settings, unusually fast or slow answering behaviour, straight-lining in grid questions, minimum time to answer vignette questions. Of the 3070 completed questionnaires (including vignette evaluations), 2087 (67.98 percent) met the quality criteria.

3.4. Study context

The study, conducted in Germany, Norway, Poland, and Romania, did not aim to provide an international comparative analysis, but rather to examine the reliability and the robustness of the findings across diverse national contexts. Attention should be given to three categories of contextual factors that may shape the scale of care-based discrimination: economic and labour market conditions, family policy models and gender norms.

The literature has highlighted how economic and labor market conditions can affect employers' decision-making (Baert et al., 2015). A difficult economic conjuncture can directly lead to discriminate vulnerable groups of applicants. If the employers are risk-averse, they might be particularly sensitive to characteristics signaling lower productivity in periods of economic uncertainty (Auer et al., 2023; Bjørnshagen, 2021; Castellano & Rocca, 2017). At the same time, during the economic downturns the volume of applicants for available positions is high giving employers more opportunities to discriminate (Birkelund, 2016). We expect that economic factors will have the least impact on potential cross-country differences in the propensity to discriminate. In recent years, the economic situation in all analysed countries has generally been good, with positive economic growth (except for Germany, where a slight economic stagnation has recently been observed) and an unemployment rate below the EU-27 average. Moreover, in the vignettes the labour market tightness was standardised by informing respondents that a sufficient number of job applicants had applied.

Defamilization and familization are two complementary concepts used in the literature to describe how family policies mitigate the economic risks associated with parenthood. Parental leave and public childcare provision are key indicators of familizing and defamilizing policy

approaches, respectively. Empirical evidence shows that long, unpaid (or of low replacement rate) parental leaves—typical for familizing policies—encourage parents, particularly mothers, to stay at home (Lohmann & Zagel, 2016). This imposes high parenthood-related costs on employers due to prolonged employee absences and may increase the risk of care-based discrimination. In contrast, accessible public childcare—a hallmark of defamilizing policies—facilitates the reconciliation of caregiving responsibilities with professional work, thereby reducing employers' incentives to discriminate based on care obligations. Norway has a well-developed childcare system and parental leaves of moderate length, which limits the time parents spend outside the labor market. In contrast, post-communist countries tend to be characterized by familistic policies (Thévenon, 2011; Ferragina, 2020; Javornik, 2014; Popescu, 2014). Although Romania and Poland differ considerably in the duration of parental leave, both countries provide limited access to childcare services—particularly for younger children. Germany, despite offering relatively long parental leave, has higher childcare enrollment rates than Poland and Romania. Given this context, we expect a lower level of care-related discrimination in Norway. Conversely, in post-communist countries, where familialism remains strong, statistical discrimination against women in the labor market is more likely. Germany is expected to occupy an intermediate position.

Gender norms refer to the dominant understandings of gender roles, gender relations, and parenthood. These norms are closely intertwined with policy frameworks, as they reflect assumptions—and the resulting institutional arrangements—regarding the division of labor between men and women (Pfau-Effinger, 2002). Norway exemplifies the dual breadwinner model, whereas Germany, Romania, and Poland follow variations of the male breadwinner/female part-time caregiver model. Although cultural differences exist among these three countries, a common feature is that families tend to rely primarily on male income, while women are expected to bear the main responsibility for caregiving (Jensen et al., 2017; Köhler & Crusmac, 2016; Kurowska, 2020). Such normative expectations may encourage discriminatory behavior by employers toward women, who—due to their perceived caregiving role—may be viewed as less committed or productive workers (Correll et al., 2007; González et al., 2019). Consequently, care-based discrimination in hiring is likely to be more pronounced against women in Germany, Poland, and Romania, and—if present at all—more gender-neutral in Norway

3.5. Descriptive Statistics

As will be discussed in the following sections, the Romanian sample was eventually excluded from the analysis. In this country, discrimination based on care responsibilities—a prerequisite for studying discrimination moderators—was not observed. Eventually the estimation sample consisted of 1470 respondents (8820 vignettes). Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the regression are presented in Tables A1a-A1c in *Appendix*.

By design, the distribution of vignette variable values was uniform, with the exception of the education and language level variables (see *Table A1a*). This is because two unlikely vignette combinations were excluded—we assumed that all natives (host country nationals) speak the host country language fluently and have degrees obtained in the host country. Each respondent assessed six vignettes, which explains the difference in the number of observations between the vignette-level and respondent-level variables.

The respondents' characteristics and other variables presented in *Table A1c* show a prevalence of men, individuals with tertiary education, relatively young participants, and those holding

upper managerial positions. Survey participants were asked to select at least one (out of five) occupation they felt most competent to evaluate. If multiple occupations were chosen, the system selected one in a way that ensured a uniform distribution of evaluated jobs. This objective was largely achieved.

Table A1b summarizes detailed organizational characteristics. The composite indicators are presented prior to aggregation and standardization. In particular, the recruitment formalization indicator includes three dimensions. Most respondents stated that their organizations document the recruitment process and clearly define evaluation criteria. However, many acknowledged that managers—who make the final hiring decisions—can override these criteria. Among the three dimensions of flexible working arrangements, remote work was the most common. Still, most respondents acknowledged that working remotely at least two days per week is difficult for a person employed on the position the evaluated candidates applied for. The least flexible aspect was taking short-notice days off, reported as difficult by 80% of respondents. The evaluated positions were widely seen as "greedy jobs"—with most respondents indicating that the jobs at least sometimes met this definition across all four dimensions. Most of the organizations described by respondents had implemented diversity policy measures, with diversity-oriented hiring practices being the most common. The relatively low share of organizations with formal diversity policy aims is due to the survey question specifying that such aims must be reported, monitored, and aligned with the presence of a diversity manager.

4.Empirical Strategy

In the empirical analysis, we employ a three-step estimation strategy. First, using a two-level random intercept linear model, with vignettes nested within individuals, we regress the dependent variable (log of likelihood of hiring) on the vignette variables separately for each country to identify where discrimination based on caring responsibilities occurs. The results from this step provide a foundation for the subsequent analysis of organisational-level moderators of discrimination. In the second step, we estimate a two-level random intercept linear model[7] using a pooled sample of countries where caring responsibilities discrimination has been identified. The model takes the following form:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Parent_{ij} + \beta_2 Partner_{ij} + \beta_3 Parent_{ij} Partner_{ij} + Vign_{ij}\beta_4 + Ind_j\beta_5 + Org_j\beta_6 + Parent_{ij} Org_j\beta_7 + Partner_{ij} Org_j\beta_8 + Parent_{ij} Partner_{ij} Org_j\beta_9 + Other_j\beta_{10} + Country\beta_{11} + u_j + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (1)$$

where:

Y_{ij}: natural logarithm of likelihood (0-10) a candidate would be employed in the organisation for a given position

- $Parent_{ij}$: parenthood status vignette variable (0 – the candidate has no children, 1 – the candidate raises a preschool-aged child)

[7] In the model specification, we do not distinguish between the respondent and organisation levels, as the anonymous data collection process did not allow us to identify cases where respondents represented the same organisation. However, we expect such cases to be rare.

- $Partner_{ij}$: partnership status vignette variable (0 – the candidate lives alone, 1 – the candidate lives with a partner/spouse)
- $Vign_{ij}$: set of remaining vignette variables as presented in *Table 1* and vignette order control
- Ind_j: respondents' characteristics: gender, parenthood status, tertiary education degree, position in the organisation/recruitment process
- Org_j: respondents' firm/organisation characteristics: variables as described in Table x2 as well as company size and ownership status (private, public or mixed)
- $Other_j$: other control variables: location of the firm/organisation (size of the city/town), whether firm has branches or a headquarter abroad, occupation evaluated (ICT technician, office clerk, secretary, bookkeeping clerk, sales worker), sample source
- $Country$: country fixed effects (Germany, Norway, Poland)
- u_j, ϵ_{ij}: error terms at individual/firm and vignette level respectively

Our caregiving proxies include parenthood status, partnership status, and their interaction. A negative coefficient on the parenthood variable – a parenthood penalty – would indicate that employers are less likely to employ parents compared to childless individuals and thus we assume they discriminate against workers with caregiving responsibilities. Based on the literature, we expect the effect of parenthood to be moderated by the partnership status. Namely, as partners are perceived as supporting parenting duties and lowering their burden, the estimated parameter for the interaction term between parenthood and partnership status should be positive.

We next interact partnership and parenthood dummies (as well as their interaction) with organizational features (Org_j) to test the hypothesized moderating effects of the organizational context. As the literature suggests, that discrimination stemming from caregiving responsibilities concerns primarily women, we estimate the model on the pooled sample as well as separately by gender of the candidate presented in the vignette.

In the final step, to test gender-specific differences, we estimate the model described by Equation (1) with an additional three-way interaction between candidate's gender, caregiving responsibilities, and organisational factors. To avoid four-way interactions we substitute parenthood and partnership dummies with one four-categorical variable ($Care_{ij}$). This model takes the following form:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Care_{ij} + Vign_{ij}\beta_2 + Ind_j\beta_3 + Org_j\beta_4 + \beta_5 Sex_{ij} + Sex_{ij}Care_{ij}\beta_6 + Sex_{ij}Org_j\beta_7 + Care_{ij}Org_j\beta_8 + Sex_{ij}Care_{ij}Org_j\beta_9 + Other_j\beta_{10} + \beta_{11}Country + u_j + \epsilon_{ij} \quad (2)$$

5. Results

5.1. Caregiving Responsibility Discrimination by Country

The first step in analysing the factors that moderate discrimination based on caregiving responsibilities is to determine whether this type of discrimination occurs at all. For this reason, we conducted a (log-linear) regression analysis using only vignette variables separately for each country under study. The estimated effects and 90% confidence intervals are presented in *Figure 1.* To facilitate the presentation of results concerning discrimination related to caregiving responsibilities, we present the estimated effects for three groups identified by our caregiving proxies (parenthood and partnership status), using the group most burdened with caregiving – single with a child – as the reference category.

Figure 1. Determinants of Hiring Likelihood by Country (in %)





Note: ”Other ethnicity” refers to Syrians in the case of Germany and Norway, Belarusians in the case of Poland, and Nepalis in the case of Romania.

Especially in Germany and Poland, it is evident that single parents have lower hiring prospects. Caregiving is associated with a decreased hiring likelihood in Norway, although the estimated effects are relatively small and relate to the comparison between single parents and candidates in a relationship without children. This low level of care-based discrimination is not surprising in the Norwegian context, which supports the reconciliation of work and care (a partnership-based family model, accessible and developed childcare infrastructure, parental leaves shorter than in Germany and Romania as well as social norms emphasising gender equality in the right to professional work). More surprising is the absence of care-based discrimination in Romania – a country with less developed public childcare, long parental leaves, and a traditional view of gender role division[8]. Given that the analysis of factors moderating discrimination based on

[8] Discrimination based on caregiving responsibilities was also not observed in the subsample of female job applicants in Romania (not reported)

caregiving responsibilities requires its identification, further analyses will be conducted for three countries where such discrimination has been identified: Germany, Norway, and Poland.

The other estimated effects confirm our expectations, in principle. The lower likelihood of men being hired (2–5% less than women) likely reflects the choice of occupations that are mostly female-dominated. Notably, foreign educational credentials are not significantly penalized in Germany, despite its strong education–labour market links, though the negative sign aligns with expectations. Across all countries, immigrants face significantly lower hiring chances, regardless of language skills or education origin—suggesting potential nationality-based discrimination. In most countries, job-related experience emerges as the strongest predictor of the likelihood of hiring after nationality.

5.2. Organisational Features as Moderators of Care Discrimination

In this section, we analyse the organizational factors that moderate the extent of discrimination based on caregiving responsibilities. *Table 3* presents the estimations' results based on two model specifications. Model 1 includes vignette variables and the set of controls (Ind_j; $Other_j$, $Country$). Model 2 is the full model, as described in Equation (1) with all moderating factors outlined in the hypotheses. For clarity, the table presents only the most relevant estimates – care responsibilities proxy and its interaction with organisational features.

Table 3. Determinants of Hiring Likelihood: Organizational Moderators of Care-Based Discrimination (Germany, Norway, Poland pooled).

	Model 1.1 all	Model 1.2 women	Model 1.3 men	Model 2.1 all	Model 2.2 women	Model 2.3 men
child (ref. no children)	-0.037***	-0.069***	-0.026	-0.037**	-0.060**	-0.024
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.026)
in partnership (ref. single)	0.012	0.004	0.020	0.014	0.006	0.034
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.027)
partnership # child	0.022	0.054**	0.012	0.021	0.033	0.012
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.040)
firm size				-0.033***	-0.036**	-0.032**
				(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.016)
child # size				0.007	0.032*	-0.006
				(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.017)
partnership # size				0.018	0.013	0.026
				(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.018)
child # partnership # size				-0.010	-0.045*	0.012
				(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.026)
ownership (public, ref. private)				0.023	0.008	0.051
				(0.027)	(0.031)	(0.034)

child # public	0.013 (0.024)	0.029 (0.037)	-0.029 (0.037)
partnership # public	0.008 (0.024)	0.040 (0.036)	-0.035 (0.038)
child # partnership # public	-0.069* (0.036)	-0.083 (0.054)	-0.028 (0.056)
number of sources of information	0.010 (0.012)	0.011 (0.014)	0.004 (0.015)
child # sources	-0.020* (0.011)	-0.020 (0.016)	-0.022 (0.017)
partnership # sources	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.017)
child # partnership # sources	0.025 (0.016)	0.016 (0.024)	0.035 (0.025)
recruit. panel (1 pers., ref. bigger panel)	-0.032 (0.031)	-0.028 (0.036)	-0.027 (0.041)
child # panel	-0.013 (0.029)	-0.021 (0.044)	0.008 (0.044)
partnership # panel	0.011 (0.029)	0.017 (0.043)	-0.021 (0.045)
child # partnership # panel	0.020 (0.043)	-0.004 (0.065)	0.038 (0.066)
recruitment formalisation	0.013 (0.012)	0.026* (0.014)	0.000 (0.016)
child # formalisation	-0.014 (0.011)	-0.025 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)
partnership # formalisation	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.027 (0.017)	0.009 (0.017)
child # partnership # formalisation	-0.000 (0.017)	0.018 (0.025)	0.002 (0.025)
flexible working arrangements	0.023* (0.012)	0.024* (0.014)	0.021 (0.015)
child # flexible	0.026** (0.011)	0.030* (0.016)	0.019 (0.016)
partnership # flexible	-0.001 (0.011)	0.017 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.017)
child # partnership # flexible	-0.023 (0.016)	-0.041* (0.024)	-0.006 (0.025)

greedy job				-0.003 (0.012)	0.007 (0.014)	-0.011 (0.016)
child # greedy				-0.031*** (0.011)	-0.034** (0.017)	-0.019 (0.017)
partnership # greedy				0.004 (0.011)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.003 (0.018)
child # partnership # greedy				0.007 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.025)	0.012 (0.025)
diversity policy aims (yes, ref. no)				0.034 (0.029)	0.038 (0.033)	0.028 (0.037)
child # aims				-0.003 (0.027)	-0.029 (0.040)	0.017 (0.040)
partnership # aims				-0.014 (0.027)	-0.044 (0.041)	0.003 (0.042)
child # partnership # aims				0.044 (0.039)	0.111* (0.060)	-0.002 (0.062)
diversity policy measures				0.032** (0.014)	0.028* (0.016)	0.037** (0.019)
child # measures				0.029** (0.013)	0.046** (0.019)	0.013 (0.020)
partnership # measures				0.016 (0.013)	0.021 (0.020)	0.007 (0.021)
child # partnership # measures				-0.022 (0.019)	-0.038 (0.029)	0.002 (0.030)
N	8820	4410	4410	8820	4410	4410
ngrps	1470	1470	1470	1470	1470	1470
var_vign	0.116	0.110	0.120	0.115	0.109	0.119
var_ind	0.113	0.100	0.125	0.109	0.095	0.121
ICC	0.494	0.476	0.510	0.486	0.465	0.505
ll	-4424.796	-2358.693	-2617.987	-4373.670	-2309.693	-2586.359

Coefficients of two-level linear random intercept models. Variables not shown:

company characteristics – branch, location;

individual characteristics – sex, parenthood status, tertiary degree; age; job title;

other characteristics – occupation evaluated, vignette order, country, sample source, vignette variables;

dependent variable – natural log of hiring likelihood;

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; standard errors in parentheses.

In the pooled sample, the estimates related to care responsibilities remain stable across models, consistent with the presence of discrimination based on care (Models 1.1 and 2.1). In Model 1.1 we observe a 'parenthood penalty'—parents are 3.7 percent less likely to be hired compared to individuals without children. This effect is driven mainly by women – a female candidate with a child suffers a parenthood penalty of 6.9 percent. The parenthood penalty among women is reduced for mothers raising a child together with a partner, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant estimate of the *partnership × child* interaction term. Therefore, the group which is particularly subject to hiring discrimination are single mothers. In the sample of men, the abovementioned patterns are similar, however, the estimated effects are weaker and not statistically significant.

In the next step of the analysis, we turn to the hypotheses about organizational moderators of care discrimination. Contrary to expectations, greater availability of information about candidates (proxied by the number of information sources) does not reduce the extent of discrimination based on care responsibilities. Similarly, a higher level of recruitment process formalization does not appear to influence the degree of discrimination. In companies where recruitment decisions are made individually—without exposure to peer accountability—the parenthood penalty appears to be stronger (negative coefficient of the interaction term *child × panel*). However, this effect is observed only with respect to female candidates and is not statistically significant. Furthermore, the hypothesis concerning diversity-oriented goals (monitored and supported by a diversity manager) is not supported. At the 10 percent significance level, we observe a statistically significant and relatively large coefficient of the interaction *child × partnership × aims*. However, it remains unclear why partnered parents would be particularly preferred candidates in organisations with diversity-oriented goals. Thus, the least empirical support is found for Hypotheses H1, H2, H3, and H6, which are therefore rejected.

Turning to the organisational characteristics that emerged as significant moderators of discrimination based on care responsibilities: flexible working arrangements are associated with reduced discrimination (H4), thereby decreasing the parenthood penalty, as indicated by a positive and statistically significant *child × flexible* interaction term. More specifically, such arrangements appear to reduce hiring discrimination against single mothers but do not moderate hiring likelihood of partnered mothers—this effect is statistically significant within the subgroup of women, and the three-way interaction term *child × partnership × flexible* is negative and statistically significant. For jobs that can be described as "greedy"—requiring overtime, business trips, weekend work, and availability on a short notice—parents tend to have poorer hiring prospects, while childless candidates, regardless of their partnership status, are more likely to be hired (H5). As in previous findings, this effect is statistically significant only with respect to female job candidates. Finally, implementing diversity policy measures also appears to reduce the parenthood penalty (H7). Similar to flexible working arrangements, these measures—including diversity management training schemes, inclusive hiring practices, task forces, and mentoring programs—seem to benefit single but not partnered mothers. However, in this case, the *child × partnership × measures* interaction term is not statistically significant.

5.3. Gender-Specific Analysis

In this section, we take a closer look at the factors moderating the strength of care responsibilities discrimination, with a particular focus on gender differences. To this end, we estimate Equation 2 with three-way interaction terms between gender, the proxy for caregiving

responsibilities, and organizational characteristics. For ease of interpretation, the results are presented as predictive margins based on Equation 2 and visualized in the accompanying figures.

Figure 2 reveals several interesting effects. Single parents have significantly lower chances of being hired. However, the greater the number of the diversity policy measures in an organisation, the more this group benefits. Moreover, the slope of the line for the 'single with child' group among women is slightly steeper than that of any other female group, as well as steeper than the corresponding curve for men. However, the difference in slopes is only statistically significant between the 'single with child' and 'in relationship, no children' groups among women (See *Table A2a*, left column, in *Appendix*). To sum up, single mothers benefit most from diversity policy measures, in particular with comparison to childless women in relationships.

Figure 2. Care Discrimination and Diversity Policy Measures, by Gender (predictive margins)



*Fitted values of hiring probability as a function of gender, care responsibilities, and a 'diversity policy measures' proxy (z-score)

A similar pattern is observed in relation to flexible working arrangements (*Figure 3)*. Both in case of men and women, the most penalised group are single parents. The presence of flexible work arrangements helps reduce the care responsibilities penalty in hiring, although the moderating effect is generally weaker in case of men (although the only statistically significant gender difference in slopes refers to those in relationship without children, see *Table A2b*, middle column). Among women, the difference in slopes is statistically significant between single parents and both singles without children and partnered parents. Among men, the difference is statistically significant between single parents and those in relationship without children (see *Table A2a*, middle column).

Figure 3. Care Discrimination and Flexible Working Arrangements, by Gender (predictive margins)



*Fitted values of hiring probability as a function of gender, care responsibilities, and a 'flexible working arrangements' proxy (z-score)

Finally, an interesting pattern is observed with respect to greedy jobs. As the jobs become more 'greedy', the hiring prospects of mothers decline—regardless of whether they are in a relationship or not. In contrast, the hiring chances of childless women remain largely unchanged. The differences in slopes between both categories of mothers and both categories of childless women are statistically significant (see *Table A2a*, right column). For men, hiring prospects generally fall with increasing job demands, without clear distinction across caring responsibilities groups. None of the differences in slopes between the various caregiving responsibility groups are statistically significant (see *Table A2a*, right column).

Figure 4. Care Discrimination and Greedy Jobs, by Gender (predictive margins)



*Fitted values of hiring probability as a function of gender, care responsibilities, and a 'greedy job' proxy (z-score)

6. Robustness analysis

As robustness checks, we conduct two analyses. First, we rerun the regression model specified in Equation 1 using an alternative dependent variable measuring the likelihood of receiving an interview invitation on a 0–10 scale. The estimation results, presented in *Table A3* in the Appendix, confirm the robustness of our findings. At the early stage of recruitment (when decisions are made about who advances to later stages), a parenthood penalty is evident, particularly affecting female candidates. Consistent with our previous results, this penalty is mitigated by flexible working arrangements and diversity-oriented policy measures, and it increases when candidates apply for more demanding ("greedy") jobs. However, one important discrepancy arises. The results suggest that organizations with more formalized recruitment processes are less likely to invite candidates who are parents or who are in a partnership. These findings contradict H3 and support its rejection.

Second, we test for the presence of socially desirable responding (SDR), which may bias the estimates—particularly those related to the vignette variables. To account for this potential bias, we included in the survey a five-item measure of SDR (SDRS-5) developed by Hays, Hayashi, and Stewart (1989), which is a short version of the Marlowe–Crowne Social Desirability Scale. This measure presents respondents with descriptions of highly desirable behaviours that are rare and undesirable behaviours that are common. Respondents who claim they always engage in the former (e.g., 'are always good listeners, no matter who they are talking to') and never in the

latter (e.g., 'sometimes feel resentful when they do not get their way') are considered prone to SDR.

We reran regression models 1.1–1.3 presented in *Table 3*, comparing results for the full sample and the subsample not prone to SDR. The comparison of estimated effects suggests that SDR may indeed lead to underestimation of discrimination. However, statistically significant differences were observed only for the parenthood penalty (with estimates of -0.069 vs. -0.106, respectively) and the child x partnership interaction term (0.054 vs. 0.109, respectively) for female candidates. Thus, our findings may be interpreted as reflecting a lower bound of hiring discrimination based on care responsibilities.

7. Conclusions

While experimental research has documented the existence of care responsibilities discrimination—primarily against mothers—few studies have examined its organizational-level moderators. This study makes a key contribution by using a factorial survey experiment in four European countries to identify how discrimination based on care responsibilities is shaped by partnership status, and by showing how this interplay is moderated by concrete organizational conditions. By extending the analysis beyond individual-level biases to include organizational opportunity structures and job demands, this research highlights how discrimination in hiring can be reduced through organizational-level measures. The results indicate that addressing this form of discrimination requires more than attitudinal change, and a rethinking of how work is organized and how and which diversity initiatives are implemented.

Consistent with prior research (e.g., Correl, 2007; Hipp, 2020; Zamberlan et al., 2024), we find evidence of discrimination based on parenthood and partnership status, especially for women. More specifically, the results show a gendered parenthood penalty, where mothers—especially single mothers—face significant disadvantages in hiring processes. The results suggest at least three conclusions on how parenthood discrimination is moderated by organizational characteristics and job demands.

First, discrimination based on care responsibilities, particularly against mothers, seems to be less likely in organizations that have implemented diversity policy measures, such as training schemes focussed on diversity management, inclusive hiring practices, task forces, or mentoring programs. This supports previous findings that certain diversity measures, such as those that assign organizational responsibility and engage managers, are effective in reducing bias (Kalev et al., 2006; Dobbin et al., 2015, see also Holzer and Neumark, 2000). In this way, implementing certain types of diversity measures may help to reduce care-related discrimination, which is consistent with previous research on workplace inequality (e.g., Dobbin et al., 2015). In particular, policy efforts could focus on encouraging organizations to move beyond assigning a diversity manager or setting monitored targets, and adopt concrete, actionable measures like inclusive hiring practices, mentoring programs, and diversity management training to engage managers in diversity efforts.

Second, there is less discrimination based on care responsibilities in organizations that offer flexible work arrangements, potentially because recruiters in these companies are less likely to view the demands of the job as incompatible with parenthood (cf. Fuller & Hirsch, 2019). This particularly benefits single mothers, and to a lesser extent, single fathers. Therefore, by restructuring jobs to provide increased flexibility for all employees, employers may mitigate the likelihood of discrimination based on care responsibilities. Policy makers could consider

supporting the uptake of flexible and inclusive work arrangements (e.g., through public incentives or regulatory frameworks) particularly in sectors where such discrimination is most pronounced.

Finally, female candidates with a child have poorer hiring prospects for 'greedy jobs', regardless of whether they are in a relationship. Thus, whereas Goldin (2021) explains the gender pay gap with reference to women opting out of 'greedy work' due to time constraints related to childcare and domestic responsibilities, our results show that mothers may also be discriminated against when applying to such jobs. This suggests that employer-driven exclusion may also contribute to the underrepresentation of mothers in high-demand jobs. This corresponds to the findings of Ishizuka (2021), who found stronger discrimination against mothers when job demands were in greater conflict with stereotypes about motherhood.

While the above-mentioned organizational-level factors, such as specific diversity policy measures and flexible work arrangements, reduce discrimination, others, including using more sources of information, more developed recruitment panels/boards, and formalized recruitment practices, do not significantly moderate the outcomes. Additionally, we did not find lower levels of care-related discrimination in organizations that have established diversity goals that are subject to monitoring and that have an employee responsible for such aims (e.g., a diversity manager), in contrast to what we expected based on previous research on organizational diversity initiatives (Kalev et al., 2006; Dobbin et al., 2015). While this may imply that these factors do not matter for reducing care-related discrimination, it could also result from the adopted empirical strategy. Despite the limitations of the FSE method discussed in Section 3.1 (socially desirable responding, insufficient effort responding, intentions vs. actual behaviour), which we have attempted to mitigate, it is also important to consider the question of generalizability of our findings. All individuals depicted in the vignettes are young, in the early stages of their careers, with education and English proficiency levels aligned with typical job requirements. They have two years of professional experience and no history of unemployment. The estimated effects may differ for less employable populations. Although it is difficult to predict how the vignette design affects the overall estimates of discrimination, one element is likely to attenuate the observed caregiving-related effects. Because all candidates are young, they may be subject to the so-called fertility penalty—that is, employers may assume that, even if a candidate does not currently have children, their status may soon change. This perceived fertility risk could reduce employability differences between candidates with and without caregiving responsibilities, thus lowering the observed impact of parenthood and partnership status.

Appendix. Supplementary tables and figures

Figure A1. Example of the vignette used in the survey (German version, before translation)



Table A1a Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variable and Vignette Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dep var: employment likelihood	8820	6.421	2.479	0.000	10.00
vign: refereces	.	.	.	.	.
you received the application directly from the candidate	8820	0.500	0.500	0.000	1.000
the candidate was recommended by one of the employees	8820	0.500	0.500	0.000	1.000
vign: sex	.	.	.	.	.
woman	8820	0.500	0.500	0.000	1.000
man	8820	0.500	0.500	0.000	1.000
vign: nationality	.	.	.	.	.
native	8820	0.333	0.471	0.000	1.000
Ukrainian	8820	0.333	0.471	0.000	1.000
other ethnic group	8820	0.333	0.471	0.000	1.000
vign: education	.	.	.	.	.
in host country	8820	0.667	0.471	0.000	1.000
in home country	8820	0.333	0.471	0.000	1.000
vign: host country language level	.	.	.	.	.
proficient level (C2)	8820	0.667	0.471	0.000	1.000
upper intermediate level (B2)	8820	0.333	0.471	0.000	1.000
vign: type of experience	.	.	.	.	.
2 years' experience in a similar position	8820	0.504	0.500	0.000	1.000
2 years' experience not related to job applied for	8820	0.496	0.500	0.000	1.000
vign: parenthood	.	.	.	.	.
preschool-aged child	8820	0.499	0.500	0.000	1.000
no children	8820	0.501	0.500	0.000	1.000
vign: partnership					
in partnership	8820	0.499	0.500	0.000	1.000
single	8820	0.501	0.500	0.000	1.000

Source: own elaboration

Table A1b Descriptive Statistics: Organisational Characteristics

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
sources of information					
No. of recruitment tools used	1470	6.028	2.338	1.000	13.000
recruitment board	.	.	.	.	.
broader recruitment panel	1470	0.824	0.380	0.000	1.000
only 1 person involved in recruitment	1470	0.176	0.380	0.000	1.000
recruitment formalisation					
recruitment process well documented[9]	.	.	.	.	.
Strongly Disagree	1469	0.030	0.170	0.000	1.000
Disagree	1469	0.045	0.207	0.000	1.000
Neither Agree nor Disagree	1469	0.088	0.283	0.000	1.000
Agree	1469	0.381	0.486	0.000	1.000
Strongly Agree	1469	0.457	0.498	0.000	1.000
clearly defined evaluation criteria	.	.	.	.	.
Strongly Disagree	1467	0.020	0.142	0.000	1.000
Disagree	1467	0.045	0.207	0.000	1.000
Neither Agree nor Disagree	1467	0.085	0.279	0.000	1.000
Agree	1467	0.452	0.498	0.000	1.000
Strongly Agree	1467	0.397	0.489	0.000	1.000
recruiters decide, regardless of criteria	.	.	.	.	.
Strongly Disagree	1465	0.027	0.161	0.000	1.000
Disagree	1465	0.092	0.289	0.000	1.000
Neither Agree nor Disagree	1465	0.126	0.332	0.000	1.000
Agree	1465	0.417	0.493	0.000	1.000
Strongly Agree	1465	0.338	0.473	0.000	1.000
flexible working arrangements	.	.	.	.	.
to vary start/end of working day					
Very easy	1428	0.092	0.289	0.000	1.000
Quite easy	1428	0.239	0.426	0.000	1.000
Quite difficult	1428	0.482	0.500	0.000	1.000
Very difficult	1428	0.187	0.390	0.000	1.000
to work remotely at least 2 days/week	.	.	.	.	.
Very easy	1430	0.183	0.386	0.000	1.000
Quite easy	1430	0.232	0.422	0.000	1.000
Quite difficult	1430	0.386	0.487	0.000	1.000
Very difficult	1430	0.199	0.399	0.000	1.000
to get days off in short notice	.	.	.	.	.
Very easy	1442	0.024	0.154	0.000	1.000
Quite easy	1442	0.171	0.377	0.000	1.000
Quite difficult	1442	0.592	0.491	0.000	1.000
Very difficult	1442	0.212	0.409	0.000	1.000
greedy job	.	.	.	.	.
overtime work					
Often	1469	0.083	0.276	0.000	1.000
Sometimes	1469	0.449	0.497	0.000	1.000
Seldom	1469	0.381	0.486	0.000	1.000

[9] Lower observation counts for some disaggregated variables result from the fact that, during aggregation, means were calculated based on non-missing values. For this reason, the aggregated variables refer to slightly larger sample sizes than the component variables.

Never	1469	0.086	0.281	0.000	1.000
working weekends and unsocial hours	.	.	.	.	.
Often	1461	0.292	0.455	0.000	1.000
Sometimes	1461	0.409	0.492	0.000	1.000
Seldom	1461	0.225	0.417	0.000	1.000
Never	1461	0.074	0.262	0.000	1.000
availability after hours on short notice	.	.	.	.	.
Often	1463	0.211	0.408	0.000	1.000
Sometimes	1463	0.467	0.499	0.000	1.000
Seldom	1463	0.262	0.440	0.000	1.000
Never	1463	0.060	0.238	0.000	1.000
business trips	.	.	.	.	.
Often	1460	0.208	0.406	0.000	1.000
Sometimes	1460	0.419	0.493	0.000	1.000
Seldom	1460	0.308	0.461	0.000	1.000
Never	1460	0.065	0.247	0.000	1.000
diversity policy aims	.	.	.	.	.
no	1470	0.616	0.486	0.000	1.000
yes	1470	0.384	0.486	0.000	1.000
diversity policy measures	.	.	.	.	.
training schemes on diversity					
no	1470	0.558	0.497	0.000	1.000
yes	1470	0.442	0.497	0.000	1.000
diversity-oriented hiring practices	.	.	.	.	.
no	1470	0.445	0.497	0.000	1.000
yes	1470	0.555	0.497	0.000	1.000
task forces	.	.	.	.	.
no	1470	0.580	0.494	0.000	1.000
yes	1470	0.420	0.494	0.000	1.000
accessible mentoring programs	.	.	.	.	.
no	1470	0.448	0.497	0.000	1.000
yes	1470	0.552	0.497	0.000	1.000
ownership	.	.	.	.	.
private	1470	0.718	0.450	0.000	1.000
public or mixed	1470	0.282	0.450	0.000	1.000
size	.	.	.	.	.
10 to 49	1470	0.213	0.409	0.000	1.000
50 to 249	1470	0.314	0.464	0.000	1.000
250 to 999	1470	0.259	0.438	0.000	1.000
More than 1000	1470	0.214	0.410	0.000	1.000
branch or headquarter abroad	.	.	.	.	.
no	1470	0.567	0.496	0.000	1.000
yes	1470	0.433	0.496	0.000	1.000
localisation	.	.	.	.	.
In the centre or suburbs of a large city	1470	0.563	0.496	0.000	1.000
In a middle-sized town	1470	0.329	0.470	0.000	1.000
In a village or small town	1470	0.108	0.311	0.000	1.000

Table A1c. Descriptive Statistics: Respondents' Characteristics and Other Control Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
sex	.	.	.	.	.
male	1470	0.552	0.497	0.000	1.000
female	1470	0.448	0.497	0.000	1.000
at least one child under 14	.	.	.	.	.
no	1470	0.510	0.500	0.000	1.000
yes	1470	0.490	0.500	0.000	1.000
tertiary education degree	.	.	.	.	.
no	1470	0.220	0.415	0.000	1.000
yes	1470	0.780	0.415	0.000	1.000
age	.	.	.	.	.
20-29	1470	0.141	0.349	0.000	1.000
30-39	1470	0.342	0.474	0.000	1.000
40-49	1470	0.292	0.455	0.000	1.000
50-59	1470	0.165	0.371	0.000	1.000
60-69	1470	0.055	0.228	0.000	1.000
70 or more years	1470	0.004	0.064	0.000	1.000
job position	.	.	.	.	.
Executive manager or owner of the organisation	1470	0.146	0.353	0.000	1.000
Senior manager or member of the board	1470	0.276	0.447	0.000	1.000
HR specialist	1470	0.171	0.377	0.000	1.000
Direct supervisor	1470	0.220	0.415	0.000	1.000
Co-worker	1470	0.064	0.245	0.000	1.000
External recruiter	1470	0.118	0.322	0.000	1.000
Other	1470	0.005	0.074	0.000	1.000
occupation evaluated	.	.	.	.	.
ICT technician	1470	0.197	0.398	0.000	1.000
office clerk	1470	0.222	0.415	0.000	1.000
secretary	1470	0.201	0.401	0.000	1.000
bookkeeping clerk	1470	0.202	0.402	0.000	1.000
sales worker	1470	0.178	0.382	0.000	1.000
vignette order	1470	3.500	1.708	1.000	6.000
country	.	.	.	.	.
Germany	1470	0.390	0.488	0.000	1.000
Norway	1470	0.240	0.427	0.000	1.000
Poland	1470	0.370	0.483	0.000	1.000
sample source	.	.	.	.	.
Cint	1470	0.367	0.482	0.000	1.000
Own	1470	0.035	0.183	0.000	1.000
Dynata	1470	0.369	0.482	0.000	1.000
Norstat (NOR)	1470	0.148	0.355	0.000	1.000
Talk Online Panel	1470	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Daisycon	1470	0.082	0.275	0.000	1.000

Source: own elaboration

Table A2a. Care Responsibilities and Probability of Hiring. Differences in Organisational Features' Slopes (ref. single, with child)

	diversity measures		flexible work		greedy jobs	
women	*Difference*	*P>z*	*Difference*	*P>z*	*Difference*	*P>z*
single, no children	-0.037	0.047	-0.037	0.021	0.046	0.004
in relationship, with child	-0.010	0.594	-0.030	0.066	0.013	0.433
in relationship, no children	-0.020	0.314	-0.021	0.186	0.046	0.006
men						
single, no children	-0.023	0.228	-0.017	0.274	0.016	0.294
in relationship, with child	-0.002	0.915	-0.018	0.251	0.010	0.515
in relationship, no children	-0.005	0.772	-0.034	0.023	0.023	0.132

*Differences: contrasts of marginal linear predictions

Table A2b. Care Responsibilities and Probability of Hiring. Differences in Organisational Features' Slopes (men, ref. women)

	diversity measures		flexible work		greedy job	
	Difference	*P>z*	*Difference*	*P>z*	*Difference*	*P>z*
single, with child	-0.012	0.517	-0.013	0.420	0.009	0.565
single, no children	0.002	0.898	0.007	0.656	-0.020	0.202
in relationship, with child	-0.004	0.833	-0.001	0.954	0.007	0.674
in relationship, no children	0.002	0.906	-0.026	0.098	-0.013	0.438

*Differences: contrasts of marginal linear predictions

Table A3. Determinants of Interview Invitation Likelihood: Organizational Moderators of Care-Based Discrimination (Germany, Norway, Poland pooled).

	Model 1.1 all	Model 1.2 women	Model 1.3 men	Model 2.1 all	Model 2.2 women	Model 2.3 men
child (ref. no children)	-0.032***	-0.055***	-0.028*	-0.036**	-0.046*	-0.032
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.025)
in partnership (ref. single)	0.014	0.006	0.027	0.020	0.008	0.042
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.027)
partnership # child	0.016	0.037	0.012	0.009	0.010	0.010
	(0.015)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.038)	(0.038)
size				-0.022*	-0.012	-0.031**
				(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.016)
child # size				0.011	0.020	0.010
				(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.016)
partnership # size				0.013	-0.004	0.030*
				(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.017)
child # partnership # size				-0.020	-0.042*	-0.006
				(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.025)
ownership (public, ref. private)				0.037	0.022	0.067**

	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.033)
child # public	0.002	0.016	-0.044
	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.035)
partnership # public	-0.016	0.024	-0.059
	(0.023)	(0.035)	(0.037)
child # partnership # public	-0.047	-0.063	-0.008
	(0.034)	(0.052)	(0.054)
sources of information	0.008	0.016	-0.003
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)
child # sources	-0.017	-0.020	-0.015
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)
partnership # sources	-0.008	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.017)
child # partnership # sources	0.024	0.012	0.038
	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.025)
recruit. panel (1 pers., ref. bigger panel)	-0.047	-0.019	-0.063
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.040)
child # panel	-0.025	-0.063	0.006
	(0.028)	(0.042)	(0.043)
partnership # panel	0.003	-0.024	0.003
	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.044)
child # partnership # panel	0.016	0.049	-0.010
	(0.041)	(0.062)	(0.064)
recruitment formalisation	0.010	0.027**	-0.005
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)
child # formalisation	-0.025**	-0.045***	-0.014
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)
partnership # formalisation	-0.007	-0.032*	0.011
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.017)
child # partnership # formalisation	0.011	0.039	0.004
	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.025)
flexible working arrangements	0.026**	0.024*	0.029*
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)
child # flexible	0.018*	0.029*	0.005
	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.016)
partnership # flexible	-0.014	0.008	-0.029*
	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.017)

child # partnership # flexible				-0.007	-0.030	0.006
				(0.015)	(0.023)	(0.024)
greedy job				-0.008	-0.006	-0.010
				(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)
child # greedy				-0.039***	-0.034**	-0.036**
				(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)
partnership # greedy				0.001	0.002	-0.008
				(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.017)
child # partnership # greedy				0.017	0.001	0.024
				(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.024)
diversity policy aims (yes, ref. no)				0.027	0.027	0.018
				(0.028)	(0.032)	(0.036)
child # aims				0.022	-0.004	0.046
				(0.025)	(0.039)	(0.039)
partnership # aims				-0.005	-0.014	0.009
				(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.041)
child # partnership # aims				0.047	0.093	0.010
				(0.038)	(0.058)	(0.059)
diversity policy measures				0.024*	0.013	0.033*
				(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.018)
child # measures				0.026**	0.050***	0.009
				(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.019)
partnership # measures				0.019	0.023	0.014
				(0.013)	(0.019)	(0.020)
child # partnership # measures				-0.029	-0.045	-0.014
				(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.029)
N	8820	4410	4410	8820	4410	4410
ngrps	1470	1470	1470	1470	1470	1470
var_vign	0.107	0.101	0.112	0.106	0.100	0.110
var_ind	0.109	0.095	0.121	0.105	0.090	0.118
ICC	0.503	0.483	0.521	0.497	0.476	0.517
ll	-	-	-	-	-	-
	4106.858	2187.647	2488.947	4050.323	2137.310	2451.376

Coefficients of two-level linear random intercept models. Variables not shown:

company characteristics – branch, location;

individual characteristics – sex, parenthood status, tertiary degree; age; job title;

other characteristics – occupation evaluated, vignette order, country, sample source, vignette variables;

dependent variable – natural log of hiring likelihood;

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; standard errors in parentheses.

Table A4 Determinants of Hiring Likelihood: Full vs. Non-SDR Sample (Germany, Norway, Poland pooled).

	Model 1.1 all	Model 1.2 women	Model 1.3 men	Model 2.1 all	Model 2.2 women	Model 2.3 men
child (ref. no children)	-0.037***	-0.069***	-0.026	-0.048***	-0.106***	-0.037
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.025)
In partnership (ref. single)	0.012	0.004	0.020	0.014	-0.009	0.021
	(0.011)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.025)
child # partnership	0.021	0.054**	0.011	0.037	0.109***	0.019
	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.037)	(0.037)
candidate recommended (ref. no recommendation)	-0.010	-0.009	-0.012	-0.013	-0.023	-0.008
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.017)
man (ref. woman)	-0.031***			-0.027**		
	(0.007)			(0.011)		
Ukrainian (ref. native)	-0.143***	-0.140***	-0.150***	-0.135***	-0.119***	-0.156***
	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.026)
other nationality (ref. native)	-0.173***	-0.169***	-0.178***	-0.158***	-0.156***	-0.165***
	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.026)
education: home country (ref. host country)	-0.031***	-0.024*	-0.042***	-0.030**	-0.044**	-0.024
	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.022)
host country language B2 (ref. C2)	-0.045***	-0.030**	-0.055***	-0.063***	-0.050**	-0.079***
	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.020)	(0.021)
experience not related to job (ref. related)	-0.107***	-0.111***	-0.097***	-0.118***	-0.115***	-0.110***
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.017)	(0.017)
N	8820	4410	4410	3894	1936	1958
ngrps	1470	1470	1470	649	649	649
var_vign	0.116	0.110	0.120	0.110	0.106	0.113
var_ind	0.113	0.100	0.124	0.123	0.106	0.135
ICC	0.493	0.475	0.510	0.530	0.498	0.544
ll	-4422.899	-2356.016	-2616.892	-1884.729	-1022.925	-1140.244

Coefficients of two-level linear random intercept models. Variables not shown:

company characteristics – branch, location;

individual characteristics – sex, parenthood status, tertiary degree; age; job title;

other characteristics – occupation evaluated, vignette order, country, sample source, vignette variables;

dependent variable – natural log of hiring likelihood;

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$; standard errors in parentheses.

References

Acker, J. (1990). Hiearchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations. *1990*, *4*(2), 139–158.

Adamovic, M., & Leibbrandt, A. (2023). A large-scale field experiment on occupational gender segregation and hiring discrimination. *Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society*, *62*(1), 34–59. https://doi.org/10.1111/irel.12318

Adda, J., Dustmann, C., & Stevens, K. (2017). The career costs of children. *Journal of Political Economy*, *125*(2), 293–337. https://doi.org/10.1086/690952

Almeida, S., Fernando, M., & Sheridan, A. (2012). Revealing the screening: Organisational factors influencing the recruitment of immigrant professionals. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, *23*(9), 1950–1965. https://doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2011.616527

Arena, D. F., Volpone, S. D., & Jones, K. P. (2023). (Overcoming) Maternity Bias in the Workplace: A Systematic Review. *Journal of Management*, *49*(1), 52–84. https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063221086243

Arrow, K. J. (1973). The theory of discrimination. In *Discrimination in Labor Markets* (pp. 3–33). Princeton University Press.

Auer, D., Ruedin, D., & Van Belle, E. (2023). No Sign of Increased Ethnic Discrimination during a Crisis: Evidence from the Covid-19 Pandemic. *Socio-Economic Review*, *21*(3), 1501–1524. https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwac069

Autor, D. H., & Scarborough, D. (2008). Does Job Testing Harm Minority Workers? Evidence from Retail Establishments*. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *123*(1), 219–277. https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.219

Baert, S., Cockx, B., Gheyle, N., & Vandamme, C. (2015). Is There Less Discrimination in Occupations Where Recruitment Is Difficult? *ILR Review*, *68*(3), 467–500. https://doi.org/10.1177/0019793915570873

Banerjee, R., Reitz, J. G., & Oreopoulos, P. (2018). Do Large Employers Treat Racial Minorities More Fairly? An Analysis of Canadian Field Experiment Data. *Canadian Public Policy*, *44*(1), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.3138/cpp.2017-033

Baranowska-Rataj, A., & Matysiak, A. (2022). Family Size and Men's Labor Market Outcomes: Do Social Beliefs About Men's Roles in the Family Matter? *Feminist Economics*, *28*(2), 93–118. https://doi.org/10.1080/13545701.2021.2015076

Baron, J. N., & Bielby, W. T. (1980). Bringing the Firms Back in: Stratification, Segmentation, and the Organization of Work. *American Sociological Review*, *45*(5), 737–765. https://doi.org/10.2307/2094893

Becker, G. S. (n.d.). *The Economics of Discrimination*. University of Chicago Press.

Becker, S. O., Fernandes, A., & Weichselbaumer, D. (2019). Discrimination in hiring based on potential and realized fertility: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment. *Labour Economics*, *59*, 139–152. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2019.04.009

Bielby, W. T. (2000). *Minimizing Workplace Gender and Racial Bias*. *29*(1), 120–129. https://doi.org/10.2307/2654937

Birkelund, G. E. (2016). Rational Laziness—When Time Is Limited, Supply Abundant, and Decisions Have to Be Made. *Analyse & Kritik*, *38*(1), 203–226. https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2016-0110

Birkelund, G. E., Lancee, B., Larsen, E. N., Polavieja, J. G., Radl, J., & Yemane, R. (2022). Gender Discrimination in Hiring: Evidence from a Cross-National Harmonized Field Experiment. *European Sociological Review*, *38*(3), 337–354. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcab043

Bjørnshagen, V. (2021). The mark of mental health problems. A field experiment on hiring discrimination before and during COVID-19. *Social Science & Medicine*, *283*, 114181. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.114181

Bjørnshagen, V. (2022). Do Large Employers Discriminate Less? An Exploration of Company Size Variation in Disability Discrimination Based on Data from two Field Experiments. *Work and Occupations*, *49*(4), 483–511. https://doi.org/10.1177/07308884221126877

Blau, F. D. (2025). Gender Inequality in the Labor Market: Continuing Progress? *ILR Review*, *78*(2), 275–303. https://doi.org/10.1177/00197939241308844

Blau, F. D., & Kahn, L. M. (2017). The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations. *Journal of Economic Literature*, *55*(3), 789–865. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20160995

Budig, M. J., & England, P. (2001). The Wage Penalty for Motherhood. *American Sociological Review*, *66*(2), 204–225. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240106600203

Budig, M. J., Misra, J., & Boeckmann, I. (2012). The Motherhood Penalty in Cross-National Perspective: The Importance of Work–Family Policies and Cultural Attitudes. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society*, *19*(2), 163–193. https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxs006

Budig, M. J., Misra, J., & Boeckmann, I. (2016). Work–Family Policy Trade-Offs for Mothers? Unpacking the Cross-National Variation in Motherhood Earnings Penalties. *Work and Occupations*, *43*(2), 119–177. https://doi.org/10.1177/0730888415615385

Bygren, M., Erlandsson, A., & Gähler, M. (2017). Do Employers Prefer Fathers? Evidence from a Field Experiment Testing the Gender by Parenthood Interaction Effect on Callbacks to Job Applications. *European Sociological Review*, *33*(3), 337–348. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcx051

Castellano, R., & Rocca, A. (2017). The dynamic of the gender gap in the European labour market in the years of economic crisis. *Quality & Quantity*, *51*(3), 1337–1357. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-016-0334-1

Castilla, E. J. (2015). Accounting for the Gap: A Firm Study Manipulating Organizational Accountability and Transparency in Pay Decisions. *Organization Science*, *26*(2), 311–333. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2014.0950

Charles, M. (2011). A World of Difference: International Trends in Women's Economic Status. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *37*(Volume 37, 2011), 355–371. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.012809.102548

Chung, H. (2019). 'Women's work penalty' in access to flexible working arrangements across Europe. *European Journal of Industrial Relations*, *25*(1), 23–40. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959680117752829

Correll, S. J. (2017). SWS 2016 Feminist Lecture: Reducing Gender Biases In Modern Workplaces: A Small Wins Approach to Organizational Change. *Gender & Society*, *31*(6), 725–750. https://doi.org/10.1177/0891243217738518

Correll, S. J., Benard, S., & Paik, I. (2007). Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty? *American Journal of Sociology*, *112*(5), 1297–1339. https://doi.org/10.1086/511799

Cortés, P., & Pan, J. (2019). When Time Binds: Substitutes for Household Production, Returns to Working Long Hours, and the Skilled Gender Wage Gap. *Journal of Labor Economics*. https://doi.org/10.1086/700185

Cortina, C., Rodríguez, J., & González, M. J. (2021). Mind the Job: The Role of Occupational Characteristics in Explaining Gender Discrimination. *Social Indicators Research*, *156*(1), 91–110. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-021-02646-2

Cuddy, A. J. C., Fiske, S. T., & Glick, P. (2004). When Professionals Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn't Cut the Ice. *Journal of Social Issues*, *60*(4), 701–718. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-4537.2004.00381.x

Cukrowska-Torzewska, E., & Lovasz, A. (2020). The role of parenthood in shaping the gender wage gap – A comparative analysis of 26 European countries. *Social Science Research*, *85*, 102355. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2019.102355

Cukrowska-Torzewska, E., & Matysiak, A. (2020). The motherhood wage penalty: A meta-analysis. *Social Science Research*, *88–89*, 102416. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2020.102416

del Carmen Triana, M., Song, R., Um, C. T., & Huang, L. (2024). Stereotypical Perception in Management: A Review and Expansion of Role Congruity Theory. *Journal of Management*, *50*(1), 188–215. https://doi.org/10.1177/01492063231180836

Dobbin, F., & Kalev, A. (2022). *Getting to diversity: What works and what doesn't*. Harvard University Press. https://books.google.com/books?hl=pl&lr=&id=0OF-EAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=getting+to+diversity+dobbin&ots=87_uIxUnYN&sig=xYD-K8AU3AOxXAV8QzqwXZsKvsI

Dobbin, F., Schrage, D., & Kalev, A. (2015). Rage against the Iron Cage: The Varied Effects of Bureaucratic Personnel Reforms on Diversity. *American Sociological Review*, *80*(5), 1014–1044. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122415596416

Edelman, L. B. (1992). Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law. *American Journal of Sociology*, *97*(6), 1531–1576.

El Haj, M., Baert, S., Van Ootegem, L., Verhofstadt, E., & Lippens, L. (2024). *Fertility, Pregnancy, and Parenthood Discrimination in the Labour Market: A Systematic Review* (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. 5015032). Social Science Research Network. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5015032

Eriksson, S., Johansson, P., & Langenskiöld, S. (2017). What is the right profile for getting a job? A stated choice experiment of the recruitment process. *Empirical Economics*, *53*(2), 803–826. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-016-1133-1

Erlandsson, A., Bygren, M., & Gähler, M. (2024). Is there a rating bias of job candidates based on gender and parenthood? A laboratory experiment on hiring for an accounting job. *Acta Sociologica*, *67*(3), 371–386. https://doi.org/10.1177/00016993231204766

Erosa, A., Fuster, L., Kambourov, G., & Rogerson, R. (2022). Hours, Occupations, and Gender Differences in Labor Market Outcomes. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics*, *14*(3), 543–590. https://doi.org/10.1257/mac.20200318

Fernandez-Lozano, I., González, M. J., Jurado-Guerrero, T., & Martínez-Pastor, J.-I. (2020). The Hidden Cost of Flexibility: A Factorial Survey Experiment on Job Promotion. *European Sociological Review*, *36*(2), 265–283. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcz059

Ferragina, E. (2020). Family policy and women's employment outcomes in 45 high-income countries: A systematic qualitative review of 238 comparative and national studies. *Social Policy & Administration*, *54*(7), 1016–1066. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12584

Fibbi, R., Midtbøen, A. H., & Simon, P. (2021). *Migration and Discrimination: IMISCOE Short Reader*. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67281-2

Forster, A. G., & Neugebauer, M. (2024). Factorial survey experiments to predict real-world behavior: A cautionary tale from hiring studies. *Sociological Science*, *11*, 886–906.

Fossati, F., Knotz, C., Liechti, F., & Otmani, I. (2024). The Gender Employment Gap among Refugees and the Role of Employer Discrimination: Experimental Evidence from the German, Swedish and Austrian Labor Markets. *International Migration Review*, *58*(1), 147–172. https://doi.org/10.1177/01979183221134274

Fuller, S. (2018). Segregation across Workplaces and the Motherhood Wage Gap: Why Do Mothers Work in Low-Wage Establishments? *Social Forces*, *96*(4), 1443–1476. https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sox087

Fuller, S., & Hirsh, C. E. (2019). "Family-Friendly" Jobs and Motherhood Pay Penalties: The Impact of Flexible Work Arrangements Across the Educational Spectrum. *Work and Occupations*, *46*(1), 3–44. https://doi.org/10.1177/0730888418771116

Galos, D. R., & Coppock, A. (2023). Gender composition predicts gender bias: A meta-reanalysis of hiring discrimination audit experiments. *Science Advances*, *9*(18), eade7979. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.ade7979

Goldin, C. (2021). *Career and Family: Women's Century-Long Journey toward Equity*. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691226736

González, M. J., Cortina, C., & Rodríguez, J. (2019). The Role of Gender Stereotypes in Hiring: A Field Experiment. *European Sociological Review*, *35*(2), 187–204. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcy055

Güngör, G., & Biernat, M. (2009). Gender Bias or Motherhood Disadvantage? Judgments of Blue Collar Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace. *Sex Roles*, *60*(3), 232–246. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-008-9540-1

Guryan, J., & Charles, K. K. (2013). Taste-based or Statistical Discrimination: The Economics of Discrimination Returns to its Roots. *The Economic Journal*, *123*(572), 417–432. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12080

Hainmueller, J., Hangartner, D., & Yamamoto, T. (2015). Validating vignette and conjoint survey experiments against real-world behavior. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, *112*(8), 2395–2400. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1416587112

Halrynjo, S., & Mangset, M. (2024). Motherhood Penalty—Beyond Bias? From Stereotypes to Substitutability Structures. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society*, jxae027. https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxae027

Henle, C. A., Fisher, G. G., McCarthy, J., Prince, M. A., Mattingly, V. P., & Clancy, R. L. (2020). Eldercare and Childcare: How Does Caregiving Responsibility Affect Job Discrimination? *Journal of Business and Psychology*, *35*(1), 59–83. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-019-09618-x

Hipp, L. (2020). Do Hiring Practices Penalize Women and Benefit Men for Having Children? Experimental Evidence from Germany. *European Sociological Review*, *36*(2), 250–264. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcz056

Holzer, H. J., & Neumark, D. (2000a). What Does Affirmative Action Do? *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, *53*(2), 240–271. Dominik. https://doi.org/10.2307/2696075

Holzer, H. J., & Neumark, D. (2000b). What Does Affirmative Action Do? *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, *53*(2), 240–271. Dominik. https://doi.org/10.2307/2696075

Ishizuka, P. (2021). The Motherhood Penalty in Context: Assessing Discrimination in a Polarized Labor Market. *Demography*, *58*(4), 1275–1300. https://doi.org/10.1215/00703370-9373587

Javornik, J. (2014). Measuring state de-familialism: Contesting post-socialist exceptionalism. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *24*(3), 240–257. https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928714525815

Jensen, P. H., Møberg, R. J., Och, R., & Pfau-Effinger, B. (2017). Explaining differences in women's working time in European cities. *European Societies*, *19*(2), 138–156. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2016.1268700

Kalev, A., Dobbin, F., & Kelly, E. (2006). Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies. *American Sociological Review*, *71*(4), 589–617. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240607100404

Kang, S. K., DeCelles, K. A., Tilcsik, A., & Jun, S. (2016). Whitened Résumés: Race and Self-Presentation in the Labor Market. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *61*(3), 469–502. https://doi.org/10.1177/0001839216639577

Kasperska, A., Matysiak, A., & Cukrowska-Torzewska, E. (2024). Managerial (dis) preferences towards employees working from home: Post-pandemic experimental evidence. *PloS One*, *19*(5), e0303307.

Kelly, E. L. (2005). Discrimination against Caregivers? Gendered Family Responsibilities, Employer Practices, and Work Rewards. In L. B. Nielsen & R. L. Nelson (Eds.), *Handbook of Employment Discrimination Research: Rights and Realities* (pp. 353–374). Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-3455-5_18

Kleven, H., & Landais, C. (2017). Gender Inequality and Economic Development: Fertility, Education and Norms. *Economica*, *84*(334), 180–209. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecca.12230

Kleven, H., Landais, C., Posch, J., Steinhauer, A., & Zweimüller, J. (2019). Child Penalties across Countries: Evidence and Explanations. *AEA Papers and Proceedings*, *109*, 122–126. https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.20191078

Kline, P., Rose, E. K., & Walters, C. R. (2022). Systemic Discrimination Among Large U.S. Employers. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *137*(4), 1963–2036. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac024

Köhler, I., & Crusmac, O. (2016). Gender Mainstreaming and Work-Family Reconciliation. An Analysis of Family Policies in Romania and Germany. *The Romanian Journal of Society and Politics*, *11*, 49–74.

Kübler, D., Schmid, J., & Stüber, R. (2018). Gender discrimination in hiring across occupations: A nationally-representative vignette study. *Labour Economics*, *55*, 215–229. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2018.10.002

Kurowska, A. (2020). Gendered Effects of Home-Based Work on Parents' Capability to Balance Work with Non-work: Two Countries with Different Models of Division of Labour Compared. *Social Indicators Research*, *151*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-018-2034-9

Lerner, J. S., & Tetlock, P. E. (1999). Accounting for the effects of accountability. *Psychological Bulletin*, *125*(2), 255–275. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.125.2.255

Lippens, L., Vermeiren, S., & Baert, S. (2023). The state of hiring discrimination: A meta-analysis of (almost) all recent correspondence experiments. *European Economic Review*, *151*, 104315. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104315

Lohmann, H., & Zagel, H. (2016). Family policy in comparative perspective: The concepts and measurement of familization and defamilization. *Journal of European Social Policy*, *26*(1), 48–65. https://doi.org/10.1177/0958928715621712

Mari, G., & Cutuli, G. (2021). Do Parental Leaves Make the Motherhood Wage Penalty Worse? *European Sociological Review*, *37*(3), 365–378. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcaa048

Mari, G., & Luijkx, R. (2020). Gender, parenthood, and hiring intentions in sex-typical jobs: Insights from a survey experiment. *Research in Social Stratification and Mobility*, *65*, 100464. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2019.100464

Matysiak, A., & Cukrowska-Torzewska, E. (2021). Gender and labour market outcomes. In N. F. Schneider & M. Kreyenfeld (Eds.), *Research Handbook on the Sociology of the Family*. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788975544.00032

Matysiak, A., & Vignoli, D. (2008). Fertility and Women's Employment: A Meta-analysis: Fécondité et travail des femmes: une méta-analyse. *European Journal of Population / Revue Européenne de Démographie*, *24*(4), 363–384. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10680-007-9146-2

Midtbøen, A. H. (2015). The context of employment discrimination: Interpreting the findings of a field experiment. *The British Journal of Sociology*, *66*(1), 193–214. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12098

Munsch, C. L. (2016). Flexible Work, Flexible Penalties: The Effect of Gender, Childcare, and Type of Request on the Flexibility Bias. *Social Forces*, *94*(4), 1567–1591. https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/sov122

OECD. (2020, September 2). *All Hands In? Making Diversity Work for All*. OECD. https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/all-hands-in-making-diversity-work-for-all_efb14583-en.html

Oesch, D., Lipps, O., & McDonald, P. (2017). The wage penalty for motherhood: Evidence on discrimination from panel data and a survey experiment for Switzerland. *Demographic Research*, *37*, 1793–1824. https://doi.org/10.4054/DemRes.2017.37.56

Pager, D., & Shepherd, H. (2008). The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *34*(1), 181–209. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131740

Petersen, T., & Saporta, I. (2004). The Opportunity Structure for Discrimination. *American Journal of Sociology*, *109*(4), 852–901. https://doi.org/10.1086/378536

Peterson Gloor, J. L., Okimoto, T. G., & King, E. B. (2022). "Maybe baby?" The employment risk of potential parenthood. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *52*(8), 623–642. https://doi.org/10.1111/jasp.12799

Petzold, K., & Wolbring, T. (2019). What Can We Learn From Factorial Surveys About Human Behavior? *Methodology*, *15*(1), 19–30. https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-2241/a000161

Pfau-Effinger, B. (2002). Changing welfare states and labour markets in the context of European gender arrangements. In J. G. Andersen & P. H. Jensen (Eds.), *Changing labour markets, welfare policies and citizenship* (p. 0). Policy Press. https://doi.org/10.1332/policypress/9781861342720.003.0011

Pfau-Effinger, B. (2012). Women's employment in the institutional and cultural context. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, *32*(9/10), 530–543. https://doi.org/10.1108/01443331211257634

Pickett, J. T. (2025). Invalidating Factorial Survey Experiments Using Invalid Comparisons Is Bad Practice: Learning from Forster and Neugebauer (2024). *Sociological Science*, *12*, 97–105.

Popescu, R. (2014). Family policies in Romania within the European framework. *Journal of Community Positive Practices*, *3*, Article 3.

Quillian, L., & Midtbøen, A. H. (2021). Comparative Perspectives on Racial Discrimination in Hiring: The Rise of Field Experiments. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *47*(1), 391–415. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-090420-035144

Reskin, B. F. (2000). The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination. *Contemporary Sociology*, *29*(2), 319–328. JSTOR. https://doi.org/10.2307/2654387

Reskin, B. F. (2003). Including mechanisms in our models of ascriptive inequality. *American Sociological Review*, *68*(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.2307/3088900

Ridgeway, C. L., & Cornell, S. J. (2006). Consensus and the Creation of Status Beliefs. *Social Forces*, *85*(1), 431–453.

Sommet, N., & Morselli, D. (2017). Keep Calm and Learn Multilevel Logistic Modeling: A Simplified Three-Step Procedure Using Stata, R, Mplus, and SPSS. *International Review of Social Psychology*, *30*(1), 203–218. https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.90

Stefanova, V., & Latu, I. (2022). Navigating the leaky pipeline: Do stereotypes about parents predict career outcomes in academia? *PLOS ONE*, *17*(10), e0275670. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0275670

Thévenon, O. (2011). Family Policies in OECD Countries: A Comparative Analysis. *Population and Development Review*, *37*(1), 57–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2011.00390.x

Thijssen, L., Coenders, M., & Lancee, B. (2021). Is there evidence for statistical discrimination against ethnic minorities in hiring? Evidence from a cross-national field experiment. *Social Science Research*, *93*, 102482. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2020.102482

Waismel-Manor, R., & Levanon, A. (2024). Inequality Within the Family: A Comparative Analysis of Gendered Working Time Preferences Among Dual-Earner Couples. *Sex Roles*, *90*(7), 832–847. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-024-01481-2

Wiswall, M., & Zafar, B. (2018). Preference for the workplace, investment in human capital, and gender. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *133*(1), 457–507. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjx035

Yu, W., & Kuo, J. C.-L. (2017). The Motherhood Wage Penalty by Work Conditions: How Do Occupational Characteristics Hinder or Empower Mothers? *American Sociological Review*. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122417712729

Zamberlan, A., Gioachin, F., & Barbieri, P. (2024). Hiring intentions at the intersection of gender, parenthood, and social status. A factorial survey experiment in the UK labour market. *European Sociological Review*, jcae043. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcae043

PATHS 2 INCLUDE

paths2include.eu

This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon Europe research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement No Project 101094626. *Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. The European Union cannot be held responsible for them. The deliverable is under review by the European Commission*.

Consortium members

OSLO METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY
STORBYUNIVERSITETET

arco

FAMILIES EUROPE

ibs institute for structural research

ICUB RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF BUCHAREST

Leibniz Universität Hannover

UNIVERSITÉ DU LUXEMBOURG

Universitat de Girona

Contact

Dominik Buttler, Leibniz University of Hannover, Germany
d.buttler@ish.uni-hannover.de