

Taste Heterogeneity, Elasticity of

Substitution and Green Growth

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- Goal: understand the relation between elasticity of demand and the distribution of consumers' taste
- The elasticity is the primitive in a range of models
 - monopolistic competition
 - endogenous growth
 - optimal diversity
- How the results depends on the degree of consumers heterogeneity

Related Literature

- . . :
- Relating elasticity of substitution and elasticity of demand to taste heterogeneity of consumers
 - Hotelling (1929), Salop (1979), Perloff and Salop (1985), Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1988, 1989)
- love for variety of a representative consumer:
 - Dixit and Stiglitz (1975, 1977,1979, 1993), Pettingel (1979), Yang and Heijdra (1993)
- Anderson de Palma and Thisse (1987): CES as a reduced form of a discrete choice model.



- In the presence of consumers' taste heterogeneity, price elasticity of demand can be expressed as an increasing function of
 - elasticity of substitution between goods for individual consumer and
 - dispersion of consumers' relative valuation of goods

Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)



• Representative consumer with preferences described by the CES utility function:

$$U = \left(\sum_{j=1}^{N_t} (x_j)^{\rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

• The share of income devoted for good *j*:

$$\phi_j = \frac{Q_j p_j}{Y} = \frac{p_j^{-\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}}{\sum_k p_k^{-\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}}$$

• and price elasticity of demand is

$$\frac{dQ_j}{dp_{jt}}\frac{p_j}{Q_j} = -\frac{1}{1-\rho}$$

Dixit and Stiglitz (1977)

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$$rac{dQ_j}{d
ho_{jt}}rac{
ho_j}{Q_j}=-rac{1}{1-
ho}\left(1-
ho\,\phi_j
ight)$$

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$$rac{dQ_j}{d
ho_{jt}}rac{
ho_j}{Q_j} = \left[-rac{1}{1-
ho}\left(1-\phi_j
ight)
ight] + \left[-\phi_j
ight]$$

• Consumer with preferences described by the CES utility function:

$$U_i = \sum_{j=1}^{N_t} \left(heta_{ij} x_{ij}
ight)^
ho$$

• x_{ij} is the quantity of product *j* consumed by individual *i*

- θ_{ij} is the idiosyncratic taste parameter
- Taste heterogeneity: each consumer might have different valuation of product j

Individual and Aggregate Demand

ullet The demand faced by the producer if $\rho < 1$ is given by:

$$Q_{j} = \int \int \dots \int \frac{\left(\frac{\theta_{ij}}{p_{j}}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}}{\sum_{k} \left(\frac{\theta_{ik}}{p_{k}}\right)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}} p_{j}^{-1} yg\left(\underline{\theta}\right) d\underline{\theta}$$

• and price elasticity of demand is

$$\frac{dQ_{j}}{dp_{j}}\frac{p_{j}}{Q_{j}} = -\frac{1}{1-\rho}\left(1-\rho\frac{\int\int\dots\int\phi_{ij}^{2}yg\left(\underline{\theta}\right)d\underline{\theta}}{\int\int\dots\int\phi_{ij}yg\left(\underline{\theta}\right)d\underline{\theta}}\right)$$
$$= -\frac{1}{1-\rho}\left(1-\frac{E\left(\phi_{ij}^{2}\right)}{E\left(\phi_{ij}\right)}\right) - \frac{E\left(\phi_{ij}^{2}\right)}{E\left(\phi_{ij}\right)}$$

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Meassure of taste heterogeneity

• Symetric equilibrium exists if the distribution of tastes is symmetric $(E(\phi_j) = E(\phi_k), E(\phi_j^2) = E(\phi_k^2)$ for any j, k) and if all goods have the same supply curve.

• If $\theta^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} \sim Gamma\left(\frac{\mu}{D}, \frac{1}{D}\right)$, and N is the number of goods then

$$\frac{E\left(\phi^{2}\right)}{E\left(\phi\right)}=\frac{\mu+D}{N\mu+D}$$

If $\theta^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} \sim St(\gamma, c)$, then

$$\frac{E\left(\phi^{2}\right)}{E\left(\phi\right)} = \left(\left(1-\gamma\right) + \frac{1}{N}\gamma\right)$$

• At the point of symmetric equilibrium, the demand faced by firm is given by

$$log(Q_j) = -\frac{1}{1-\rho} \left(1-\rho D(\psi) - \frac{\rho}{N} \right) * log(\rho_j)$$
$$+ \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \left(\frac{-D(\psi)}{N-1} + \frac{1}{N} \right) \sum_{k \neq j} log(\rho_k) + log\left(\frac{y}{N}\right)$$

This is exactly the Walrasian demand of the *representative consumer* with $U = \left(\sum_{j=1}^{N_t} (x_j)^{\eta}\right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}$ where $\eta = \rho \frac{1 - \frac{1}{N} - D}{1 - \frac{1}{N} - \rho D}$

- Speed of transition towards emission-free economy depends on the substitutability between dirty (emission-intensive) and clean goods
- The elasticity of substitution decreases with the dispersion of consumers' tastes
- for any given level of taste dispersion, aggregate elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty goods increases with the number of clean varieties

• Consumer *i* derive utility from two types of goods: clean and dirty:

$$u_i = \left(\theta_{ci} x_c^{\rho} + x_d^{\rho}\right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

• The clean and dirty goods produced with labour and the range of machines:

$$Q_j = l_j^{1-lpha} \int_0^1 A_{vj}^{1-lpha} z_{vj}^{lpha} dv$$

- Machines supplied by monopolists charging the mark-up $\mu = \frac{1}{\alpha}$ over unit cost of production, φ
- Production of dirty good is associated with CO2 emissions, $M = \vartheta Q_d$

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$$M = \vartheta Q_d$$

In equilibrium

$$\frac{d\log(M)}{dt} = \frac{d\log(Q_d)}{d\log(A_c)} \frac{d\log(A_c)}{dt}$$
$$\frac{d\log(Q_d)}{d\log(A_c)} = \alpha - \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \left(1-\alpha\right) \left(1 - \frac{E\left[\phi_{id}^2\right]}{E\left[\phi_{id}\right]}\right)$$

• Suppose there is a variaty of clean goods and for individual consumer they are perfectly substitutable:

$$u_i = \left(\left(\sum_{k=1}^n \theta_{cik} x_{cik} \right)^{\rho} + x_{id}^{\rho} \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

- Suppose also that θ_{cik} are iid with cdf given by $G(\theta)$.
- Each consumer chooses one favourite clean good.

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$\frac{d\log(M)}{dt} = \left(\alpha - \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \left(1-\alpha\right) \left(1 - \frac{E\left[\phi_{id}^2\right]}{E\left[\phi_{id}\right]}\right)\right) \frac{d\log(A_c)}{dt}$ $\frac{E\left[\phi_{id}^2\right]}{E\left[\phi_{id}\right]} = \frac{\int \phi_d^2 G(x)^{n-1} g(x) dx}{\int \phi_d G(x)^{n-1} g(x) dx}$

which is a decreasing function of *n*, number of varieties of clean good.

- At the aggregate level, the response of change in price to the total demand for a variety depends on the first two moments of consumers taste distribution.
- When dispersion of tastes is high, the substitution effect disappears and elasticity of aggregated demand is close to unity.
- Application to green growth theory
 - heterogeneity of consumers' tastes slows down phase-out of the dirty sector and reduction of emissions.
 - increase in the number of clean varieties can reduce the mass of consumers who are unwilling to substitute the dirty good with a clean alternative.

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THANK YOU

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