

Taste Heterogeneity, Elasticity of Substitution and Green Growth

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Overview of the Theoretical Results

- In the presence of consumers' taste heterogeneity, price elasticity of demand can be expressed as a function of
 - elasticity of substitution between goods for individual consumer and
 - dispersion of consumers' relative valuation of goods

Application to green growth theory:

- if the dispersion of consumers' tastes is large enough, technological progress in clean industries increases the consumption of dirty goods and emissions.
- This is because green growth increases real income of all consumers, including those who do not value clean goods.
- for any given level of taste dispersion, aggregate elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty goods increases with the number of varieties of the clean good.

- Relating elasticity of substitution and elasticity of demand to taste heterogeneity of consumers
 - Hotelling (1929), Salop (1979), Perloff and Salop (1985), Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1988, 1989)
- Interpretation of the Dixit and Stiglitz framework
 - Chamberlin (1950), Dixit and Stiglitz (1975, 1977, 1979, 1993), Pettingel (1979), Yang and Heijdra (1993)
- Dependence of green growth on heterogeneity of taste and number of varieties
 - Acemoglu et al. (2012, 2014) , Aghion et al. (2014), Andree and Smulders (2014), Hassler et al. (2014)

- Representative consumer with preferences described by the CES utility function:

$$U = \left(\sum_{j=1}^{N_t} (x_j)^\rho \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

- The demand faced by the producer given by:

$$Q_j = \frac{p_j^{-\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}}{\sum_k p_k^{-\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}} p_j^{-1} Y$$

- and price elasticity of demand is

$$\frac{dQ_j}{dp_j} \frac{p_j}{Q_j} = -\frac{1}{1-\rho}$$

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$$\frac{dQ_j}{dp_{jt}} \frac{p_j}{Q_j} = -\frac{1}{1-\rho} (1 - \rho \phi_j)$$

Dixit and Stiglitz with Taste Heterogeneity

- Consumer with preferences described by the CES utility function:

$$U_i = \left(\sum_{j=1}^{N_t} (\theta_{ij} x_{ij})^\rho \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

- x_{ij} is the quantity of product j consumed by individual i
 - θ_{ij} is the idiosyncratic taste parameter
 - Taste heterogeneity: each consumer might have different valuation of product j

The agent chooses optimal consumption basket, \mathbf{x} given his income, y and set of prices \mathbf{p}

Individual and Aggregate Demand

- The demand faced by the producer if $\rho < 1$ is given by:

$$Q_j = \int \int \dots \int \frac{(\theta_{ij}/p_j)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}}{\sum_k (\theta_{ik}/p_k)^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}} p_j^{-1} y g(\underline{\theta}) d\underline{\theta}$$

- and price elasticity of demand is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{dQ_j}{dp_j} \frac{p_j}{Q_j} &= -\frac{1}{1-\rho} \left(1 - \rho \frac{\int \int \dots \int \phi_{ij}^2 y g(\underline{\theta}) d\underline{\theta}}{\int \int \dots \int \phi_{ij} y g(\underline{\theta}) d\underline{\theta}} \right) = \\ &= -\frac{1}{1-\rho} \left(1 - \rho \frac{E(\phi_j^2)}{E(\phi_j)} \right) \end{aligned}$$

- Symmetric equilibrium exists if the distribution of tastes is symmetric in the sense that $E(\psi_j) = E(\psi_k)$, $E(\psi_j^2) = E(\psi_k^2)$ and $Cov(\psi_j, \psi_k) = Cov(\psi_j, \psi_h)$ for any j , k and h and if all goods have the same supply curve.
- Let $\theta^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}} \sim \text{Gamma}(\frac{\mu}{D}, \frac{1}{D})$, then, in symmetric equilibrium, $\phi = \psi = \frac{\theta^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}}{\sum_k \theta^{\frac{\rho}{1-\rho}}} \sim \text{Dirichlet}(\frac{\mu}{D}, \frac{\mu}{D}, \dots, \frac{\mu}{D})$ and

$$\frac{E(\phi^2)}{E(\phi)} = \frac{\mu + D}{N\mu + D}$$

- At the point of symmetric equilibrium, the demand faced by firm is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \log(Q_j) = & -\frac{1}{1-\rho} \left(1 - \rho D(\psi) - \frac{\rho}{N} \right) * \log(p_j) \\ & + \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} \left(\frac{-D(\psi)}{N-1} + \frac{1}{N} \right) \sum_{k \neq j} \log(p_k) + \log\left(\frac{y}{N}\right) \end{aligned}$$

This is exactly the Walrasian demand of the *representative consumer* with $U = \left(\sum_{j=1}^{N_t} (x_j)^\eta \right)^{\frac{1}{\eta}}$ where $\eta = \rho \frac{1 - \frac{1}{N} - D}{1 - \frac{1}{N} - \rho D}$

- Consumer i derive utility from two types of goods: clean and dirty:

$$u_i = (\theta_{ci}x_c^\rho + x_d^\rho)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

- The clean and dirty goods produced with labour and the range of machines:

$$Q_j = l_j^{1-\alpha} \int_0^1 A_{vj}^{1-\alpha} z_{vj}^\alpha dv$$

- Machines supplied by monopolists charging the mark-up $\mu = \frac{1}{\alpha}$ over unit cost of production, φ
- Production of dirty good is associated with pollution (or CO2 emission), $P = \vartheta Q_d$

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In equilibrium

$$\frac{d \log(P)}{dt} = \frac{d \log(Q_d)}{d \log(A_c)} \frac{d \log(A_c)}{dt}$$

$$\frac{d \log(Q_d)}{d \log(A_c)} = \alpha - \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} (1-\alpha) \left(1 - \frac{E[\phi_{id}^2]}{E[\phi_{id}]} \right)$$

Variety of Clean Goods

- Suppose there is a variety of clean goods and for individual consumer they are perfectly substitutable:

$$u_i = \left(\left(\sum_{k=1}^n \theta_{cik} x_{cik} \right)^\rho + x_{id}^\rho \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}$$

- Suppose also that θ_{cik} are iid with cdf given by $G(\theta)$.
- Each consumer chooses one favourite clean good. Let $\varphi_{ci} = \max_k \{ \theta_{cik} \}$

Effect of variety on Emission Path

$$\frac{d \log(P)}{dt} = \left(\alpha - \frac{\rho}{1-\rho} (1-\alpha) \left(1 - \frac{E[\phi_{id}^2]}{E[\phi_{id}]} \right) \right) \frac{d \log(A_c)}{dt}$$

$$\frac{E[\phi_{id}^2]}{E[\phi_{id}]} = \frac{\int \phi_d^2 G(x)^{n-1} g(x) dx}{\int \phi_d G(x)^{n-1} g(x) dx}$$

which is a decreasing function of n , number of varieties of clean good.

Application to green growth theory:

- Elasticity of substitution between goods at the aggregate level can be expressed as a function of the dispersion of consumers' relative valuation of goods
- if the dispersion of consumers' tastes is large enough, technological progress in clean industries increases the consumption of dirty goods leading to more emissions
- for any given level of taste dispersion, aggregate elasticity of substitution between clean and dirty goods increases with the number of varieties of the clean good.

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